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THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
WALTER H. E. JAEGER*
PART Ilt
STRICT LIABILITY VERSUS ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
N THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT of strict liability, there were occasional
statements indicating that "strict" and "absolute" were synonyms
since they were used interchangeably as indicated in the following
excerpt from the concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of Fresno:...
The retailer, even though not equipped to test a product, is under
an absolute liability to his customer, for the implied warranties of fit-
ness for proposed use and merchantable quality include a warranty of
safety of the product .... The courts recognize, however, that the re-
tailer cannot bear the burden of this warranty, and allow him to recoup
any losses by means of the warranty of safety attending the wholesaler's
or manufacturer's sale to him . .. Such a procedure, however, is
needlessly circuitous and engenders wasteful litigation. Much would be
gained if the injured person could base his action directly on the
manufacturer's warranty. . . . In the food products cases the courts
have resorted to various fictions to rationalize the extension of the
manufacturer's warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs with
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the chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer is assigned to the
consumer; that the consumer is a third party beneficiary of the manu-
facturer's contract with the dealer .... Such fictions are not necessary
to fix the manufacturer's liability under a warranty if the warranty is
severed from the contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer
and based on the law of torts... as a strict liability.
3 63
Some twenty years later, the Supreme Court of California took
the opportunity presented by a clear-cut product liability case, Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 64 to declare itself firmly and un-
equivocally in favor of strict liability.
As mentioned in Part I of this article, the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in Suvada v. White Motor Company,65 has accepted the doctrine of
strict liability and followed the lead of California in the case of Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.s1 6 In California, this gradually devel-
oped from the case of Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"' until now,
some twenty-five years later, the strict liability doctrine has emerged
full fledged. In a number of other cases involving beverages or bottles,
this doctrine or one similar to it has been applied in order to afford a
recovery for the injured plaintiff.
While Missouri had held that privity of contract is not necessary
to permit the purchasers of a gas range to recover on an implied war-
ranty for fire damage against a manufacturer, Morrow v. Caloric Appli-
ance Corp., 68 last year in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing
Co., the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the rule of strict liability
in tort as set forth in the Restatement :
869
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition reasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product,
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
3863 Id. at 464-66, 150 P.2d at 441-43, emphasis supplied.
364 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962), cited in Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d
420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
365 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), discussed in Part I of this article at 46
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 164-165 (1969).
366 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
367 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
368 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963), citing with approval Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has
the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1963).
369 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
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(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.3
70
Thereupon, the court quoted from the leading case, Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 71 and stated that recovery may be had for
wrongful death in a product liability case in Missouri. What had
happened was that a widow brought this action against a wholesale
distributor for the wrongful death of her husband. The latter had at-
tempted to help a neighbor pump the water out of her basement. In so
doing, he was electrocuted since there was no ground wire or "overload
protector." The appellate court held that it would have to be shown that
the pump was being used as was intended. 72 If the pump was being
used for the purpose for which it was intended and death resulted, the
plaintiff widow would be able to recover judgment.
Warranty of Seaworthiness and Absolute Liability
Although, as has been observed, there has been a substantial
modification in the law of warranty, and perhaps an even greater one
in the law of tort, holding the manufacturer, the vendor and others
in "the distributive chain" 7" liable for injuries to the consumer, and
more recently, to his goods or chattels, no development of liability is
comparable to that which has occurred in the warranty of seaworthiness.
Nowhere is the difference between strict liability as compared with
absolute liability so vividly highlighted as in the cases dealing with
breaches of the warranty of seaworthiness. The shipowner, and the steve-
370 Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A (1964), quoted in Keener v. Dayton Electric
Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
371 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). Cf. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970), applying strict liability.
372 Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
Cf. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968) rev'd and
remanded, - Ill. 2d.-, (1970) noted 1 Loyola U. L. J. 388 (1971); Heaton v. Ford Motor
Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) ; Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex 1969),
applying the strict liability rule.
See also Wyatt Industries, Inc. v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 420 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.
1969) ; Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970), holding assumption of risk
a valid defense which is effectively criticized in the dissenting opinion wherein assumption
of risk and contributory negligence are defined and distinguished; Beetler v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc., 431 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1970), no defect shown citing the Suvada case; Barbeau v.
Roddy Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1970); Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317
F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970).
373 So described in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
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dore when engaged upon "the ship's service," as when loading or un-
loading cargo, are held to an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship.
This means the vessel itself, gear, machinery and appurtenances, as
well as the crew.
However, it has also been said that although there is an absolute
duty to provide a safe and seaworthy ship, that does not require that
the vessel be "accident-free" or "perfect." '74 And in the case of strict
liability, there must be a provable defect before the manufacturer or
vendor can be held liable for any injury or damage his product may
have caused:
A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile
accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle 'more'
safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.8 7 5
Perhaps the following is a more adequate statement:
It is the duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable care under the
circumstances to so design his product as to make it not accident or
foolproof, but safe for the use for which it is intended. This duty in-
cludes a duty to design the product so that it will fairly meet any
emergency of use which can reasonably be anticipated.
376
The leading case on absolute liability is Italia Societa per Azioni
874 Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers SS Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955), cited or discussed in num-
erous cases, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964). See generally Norris, The Law of Seamen (3d ed. 1970).
375 In Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1969), an action
was brought against the manufacturer of a bus which did not have a right rearview mirror
for injuries sustained by a child when trapped under the right rear wheels of the bus as
it departed from its curbside loading platform. The court granted a motion to dismiss
quoting Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) and citing Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
In the Campo case supra, the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint which al-
leged negligent design of an "onion topping" machine in failing to include a safety device
or guard to prevent human hands from being caught in the exposed rollers.
In light of the subsequent cases, it seems most doubtful that the court would follow
Campo v. Scofield, supra; cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
While Campo v. Scoleld has become a landmark decision, it is true that a
new awareness of the problem of safe automobile design has occurred . . . . This
awareness has been primarily manifested by legislative action such as the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et. seq. There has also
been evidence of a shift in judicial thought which has eroded the Evans Esupra]
rationale .... Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 111, 113 (D. Md.
1969).
Cl. Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 423 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1970), citing
the Campo case.
376 Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84, 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
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di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc.87 decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States just six years ago. The shipowner
brought this action in admiralty against a stevedore company to recover
indemnity for breach of the stevedore's "implied warranty of workman-
like service." The basic issue was whether this warranty was breached
where the stevedore has supplied defective equipment (albeit without
negligence) which injures one of the employees engaged in the steve-
doring activity.
The contract between the shipowner and the stevedore required
the former to furnish and maintain in safe and efficient working condi-
tion suitable booms, winches, steam, lights and similar equipment.
In turn, the stevedore was to be responsible for damage to the ship or
cargo, and for injury or death suffered by any person as a result of
the stevedore's negligence.87
During the stevedoring operation in Portland, a longshoreman
employee was injured on board the vessel when a hatch tent rope
snapped and struck him. The employee recovered a judgment against
the shipowner in a state court for negligence and unseaworthiness. 79
377 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
Neill v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 426 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Guidry v. Texaco, Inc.,
430 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1970); Noble v. Bank Line, Ltd., 431 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1970);
Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Burrage
v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d (5th Cir. 1970); Drake v. E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co., Inc., 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970); Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432
F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), citing Italia Societa as a "celebrated" case; Chagois v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), citing Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc. supra.
378 In pertinent part, the contract reads:
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto, that the [Oregon] Stevedoring
Company will act as stevedores, and that they will with all possible dispatch, load
and/or discharge all cargoes of vessels owned, chartered, controlled, or managed
by the Steamship Company at all Columbia and Willamette River ports as directed.
And it is agreed that the Steamship Company will grant to the said Stevedoring
Company the exclusive rights of handling all such cargoes as before mentioned
under the terms of this agreement ....
Paragraph VIII of the agreement states:
The Stevedoring Company will be responsible for damage to the ship and its
equipment, and for damage to cargo or loss of cargo overside, and for injury to or
death of any person caused by its negligence, provided, however, when such damage
occurs to the ship or its equipment, or where such damage or loss occurs to cargo,
the ship's officers or other authorized representatives call the same to the attention
of the Stevedoring Company at the time of occurrence. The Steamship Company
shall be responsible for injury to or death of any person or for any damage to or
loss of property arising though the negligence of the Steamship Company or any of
its agents or employees, or by reason of the failure of ship's gear and/or equip-
ment.
379 The shipowner is liable for unseaworthiness, regardless of negligence, whenever the
ship or its gear is not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended and this
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The federal district court found that unseaworthiness created by the
defective rope furnished by the stevedore was the basis for the latter's
liability. However, indemnity was refused because no negligence was
proved, the defective condition of the rope not having been apparent.
s°
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground
that a stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike service is not
breached in the absence of a showing of negligence in supplying de-
fective equipment. 8 ' There being a conflict in the circuits, resolution of
the conflict was deemed important and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.8 2
Beginning its analysis with one of the Court's earlier decisions,
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp. 8 it was pointed out
that a stevedore's warranty of workmanlike service is comparable to
a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured pro-
duct. 8 ' Also, it was emphasized that the shipowner's suit for indemnifica-
tion is one for breach of contract, not for tort."'8
Subsequent decisions make it eminently clear that the stevedore's
obligation to perform his service with reasonable safety extends not only
liability extends to longshoremen and others who work aboard the vessel, including those
in the employ of contracting stevedore companies. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85 (1946). Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362
U.S. 539 (1960). If the owner engages others who supply the equipment necessary for
stevedoring operations, he must still answer to the longshoreman if the gear proves to be
unseaworthy. Alaska S. S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). This liability is strict
and nondelegable. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, supra; Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944).
880 The district court was apparently laboring under the misapprehension that negli-
gence was necessary before there could be a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness;
however, the opposite has been held.
The reason that indemnity was disallowed was that the vessel owner, not having proved
negligence, it was thought that the contractual provision rendering the stevedore liable
for injuries caused by its negligence was in effect an express disclaimer against an implied
warranty of workmanlike service. See the contract as quoted supra note 378.
881 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 301 F.2d
481 (9th Cir. 1962).
382 372 U.S. 963 (1963).
383 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
884 Citing:
George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alaska) ; Hessler v. Hillwood Mig. Co., 302
F.2d 61 (C. A. 6th Cir.) ; Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.) ;
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69. See Frumer and Fried-
man, Products Liability, § 10.01, and cases cited therein; Uniform Sales Act, Uni-
form Laws Annotated (1950 ed.), § 15 (1) ; Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform
Laws Annotated (1962 ed.), § 2-315. See generally Williston, Sales, § 237 (Rev. ed.
1948 and Supp. 1963).
Cf. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
385 4 and 10 Williston Contracts §§ 626, 1086A respectively (3d ed. Jaeger 1967).
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to the handling and stowage of cargo but also to the use of equipment
incidental thereto,"' including defective equipment supplied by the
shipowner,"' and that the shipowner's negligence is not fatal to re-
covery against the stevedore."' 8 However, the Court pointed out that
the implied warranty to supply reasonably safe equipment may be
satisfied with something less than absolutely perfect equipment; never-
theless, the test is "whether the equipment was in fact safe and fit for its
intended use." ' 9 As the Supreme Court aptly phrased it:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated
to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty
only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their
intended use. The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness;
not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every
imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her
intended service.839
It is noteworthy that the contract between the shipowner and the
stevedore gave the latter full control and supervision of the loading and
unloading operations. This did not in any way alter the shipowner's
liability to the injured employee, since the duty to supply a seaworthy
vessel cannot be delegated; it extends "to those who perform the unload-
ing and loading portion of the ship's work." The stevedore was con-
sidered to be "in a far better position to avoid the accident. The
shipowner defers to the qualification of the stevedoring contractor in
the selection and use of equipment and relies on the competency of the
stevedoring company.
' '1 g9
Emphasizing the existence of the contract concept in warranties of
seaworthiness, the Ninth Circuit had said:
In recent history liability for breach of warranty has been associated
with contract more than anything else. - . Concepts of privity of
contract are ever more gradually giving way to sweeping coverage
of warranty. . . . In Waterman and Crumady, the shipowner was
allowed to recover for breach of warranty even though there was no
direct contract relationship between him and the Stevedoring Company.
However, the contract idea was adhered to since the ship or shipowner
were considered to be the third-party beneficiaries of the contract
886 Citing Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
87 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), and Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960).
888 Citing Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
389 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 301 F.2d
481 (9th Cir. 1962).
890 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
891 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946).
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between the stevedoring company and the one who contracted for its
services.392
Reversing, the Supreme Court remarked that "liability should
fall upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and
thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury.' 393
An examination of the more recent cases following the line of
absolute liability laid down by the Supreme Court in Italia Societa
may prove useful. Thus, in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Steve-
doring Co.894 the question arose in an action by a longshoreman against
a shipowner-operator for injuries sustained while working aboard a
ship. The shipowner sought indemnity from the stevedore as the
longshoreman's employer for any liability of the shipowner to the
longshoreman.
The trial court, sitting in admiralty, held that the shipowner was
not entitled to indemnity from the stevedore. On appeal, however, this
decision was reversed and the court quoted the Supreme Court decision
in Italia Societa.95 In the course of its opinion, the appellate court
noted:
[It] has been held that the failure of stevedore to remedy, or
cause the ships crew to remedy, the condition of a missing safety pin
in a ship's winch of which the stevedore had constructive notice,
constituted breach of warranty requiring the stevedore to indemnify
the shipowner against loss arising from the defect. 96
Thus, in a recent case the same court reviewed the applicable
392 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 310 F.2d 481,
485 (9th Cir. 1962). See 2 Williston, Contracts Ch 14 (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
393 376 U.S. 315 (1964). Cf. In Re Marine Sulphur Transport Corp., 312 F. Supp.
1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), citing the leading cases including Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,
362 U.S. 539 (1960) and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
394 388 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1968).
395 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964).
Neill v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 426 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970); Guidry v. Texaco,
Inc., 430 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Noble v. Bank Line, Ltd., 431 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1970) ;
Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1970); Burrage
v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d (5th Cir. 1970); Drake v. E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co., Inc. 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 1970) citing Italia Societa supra as a "celebrated" case; Chagois v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), citing Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc. supra.
396 Victory Carriers, Inc., v. Stockton Stevedoring Co., 388 F.2d 955, 959 (9th Cir.
1968) citing Drago v. A./S. Inger, 194 F. Supp. 398 (S.DJ.N.Y. 1961) af'd 305 F.2d 139
(2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, sub nom. Daniels & Kennedy, Inc. v. A./S. Inger, 371 U.S.
925 (1962).
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principles in H & H Ship Service Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Line. 97 There
the court said, "In Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating
Co.,... the Supreme Court of the United States suggested that the 'ves-
sel owner was entitled to indemnification from a sub-standard perform-
ing stevedore, "absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude
recovery." ' ,39
In another case, Wilson v. Societa Italiana de Armamento °° a
longshoreman filed a libel against the shipowner for injuries sustained
aboard the vessel. The lower court had held that there was no basis for
the action 1 and the appellate court affirmed on the ground that merely
because the area in which the longshoreman was obliged to work was
somewhat cramped or confining, did not render the area unsafe as a
matter of law, citing Luma v. Kawasaki Kaisan Keisho, Ltd.4"2
There was a total failure on the part of the plaintiff to show that
the vessel in question was unseaworthy; accordingly, since the evidence
failed to support the plaintiff's contention, the judgment below was
affirmed.
In a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Penn Tanker
Co. v. United States,"' the shipowner, having settled a Jones Act suit,
sought full indemnity against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 4
The steamship company contended that there had been a
failure by the United States government to provide seamen with
proper professional care and that the shipowner had been required to
pay for damages resulting from the breaches of such duty and therefore
the shipowner was the beneficiary of the duty owed to the seamen for
the breach of which the shipowner was entitled to full indemnity.
The basis for this was the implied warranty of workmanlike
397 382 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1967).
398 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
899 H & H Ship Service Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Line, 382 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1967).
400 409 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1969).
401 Wilson v. Societa Italiana de Armamento, 279 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1968). See
In Re Marine Sulphur Transport Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), citing Greeno
v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802
(1960) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
402 254 F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
403 409 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1969).
404 42 U.S.C. § 249.
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performance which was stated in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan
Atlantic Steamship Corp.4"5 and Kossick v. United Fruit Co.406 Based
on these cases, the Penn Tanker Company suggested that it was entitled
to recover full indemnity from the United States Government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.4" 7
However, the court answered this contention by quoting Delta
Engineering Corp. v. Scott,4 8 where the court said, "While the maritime
jurisprudence affords a fresh example that from little acorns big oaks
may grow, we would doubt very much that the Ryan notion is to carry
over to every conceivable relationship which might exist between a ship
and a third party."4 9
The court then emphasized the fact that the right to indemnification
in the Ryan type of case is based upon breach of a contractual obliga-
tion, citing Italia Societa, Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oil-
field Service Inc., 410 Schwartz v. Compagnie Ggndral Transatlantique.411
"Here," said the court, "there was no express or implied contractual
relationship between the parties."
Finally, the court pointed out that even were the court to assume
that there was an implied warranty running from the United States to
Penn Tanker Co., the court could find no admiralty jurisdiction to sup-
port it. "Admiralty jurisdiction of torts," said the court, "is limited to
those which occur on the high seas or other navigable waters within
admiralty cognizance."4 " Since there was no admiralty jurisdiction,
the Ryan case was not applicable.
In Crosson v. N.V. Stoomvaart Mij "Nederland" '413 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a stevedore is liable to a shipowner
for counsel fees in defending the action brought against the ship. The
court cited the leading cases including Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-At-
405 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
406 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
407 42 U.S.C. § 249.
408 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963) cert. denied 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
409 Id. at 18.
410 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1967) cert. denied 389 U.S. 849 (1967).
411 285 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
412 Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 514, 518 (1969), citing The Plymouth,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland Steam-
ship Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908).
413 409 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969).
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lantic Steamship Corp., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser14
and Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co. As the
court puts it: "Liability has not been placed on the stevedore casually,
but as a matter of policy, national in impact." The court then quoted
the Supreme Court opinion in Italia Societa:
We deal here with a suit for indemnification based upon a maritime
contract, governed by federal law, * * in an area where rather special
rules governing the obligations and liabilities of shipowners prevail,
rules that are designed to minimize the hazards encountered by seamen,
to compensate seamen for the accidents that inevitably occur, and to
minimize the likelihood of such accidents. By placing the burden ulti-
mately on the company whose default caused the injury, * * we think
our decision today is in furtherance of these objectives. 415
The court then continued:
The contours of the indemnity doctrine have been developed in a series
of skirmishes between shipowners and stevedores, which will doubtless
continue. But it must be remembered that the theory of burdening the
stevedore has been that it is in the best position to 'minimize the like-
lihood' of the accident.416
The trial court had entered judgment for the shipowner417 and the
appellate court now affirmed. 18
In Atkins v. Greenville Ship Building Corporation419 the court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action for
breach of the maritime warranty of seaworthiness brought by a shore-
based worker who was injured when he fell from a ladder while climbing
to a barge brought into drydock for major repairs.
The basis for dismissal was that the barge at the time of the accident
was not "a vessel" for the purpose of applying the maritime warranty
of seaworthiness. The barge had no motive power and could only proceed
by being towed. The plaintiff cited Reed v. The Yaka 42" as a basis for
his contention that he should be entitled to recover by virtue of being
on the "ship's service." The court, however, held that the plaintiff was
"clearly within the compensation provisions of the longshoreman's com-
414 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
415 Crosson v. N.V. Stoomvaart Mij "Nederland," 409 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1969).
416 Id. at 867.
417 266 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
418 Crosson v. N.V. Stoomvaart Mij "Nederland," 409 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969).
419 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969).
420 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
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pensation Act." '421 Citing in support, Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v.
Henderson,422 and Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shea.423
The court then traced the historical development of the warranty
of seaworthiness from its humble beginnings in The Osceola424 through
Sieracki,425 Reed426 and finally Jackson v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.
427
However, even granted the great expansion in the concept of the warranty
of seaworthiness in favor of "shore-based employees, including long-
shoremen," the instant plaintiff was unable to bring himself within the
enlarged scope of this warranty.
Significantly, the court said that the shore-based worker must be
engaged in work traditionally "that of a seaman" citing United New
York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki,4 21
"excluding those persons performing such tasks as making major repairs
requiring dry docking with special skills." '429 Also, the craft or structure
said to owe a warranty of seaworthiness to its seamen or longshoremen
or others engaged upon "the ship's service" must fall within the tradi-
tional category of "vessels", as described in Ofshore Company v. Robi-
son.
430
After a further discussion of various cases, the court concluded
that a floating dry dock is not a "vessel" within the meaning of the war-
ranty of seaworthiness. 431' The court also pointed out that the attempt to
fix "unvarying meanings" having a firm legal significance to such terms
as "seamen", "vessel", "member of the crew" and similar terms "must
421 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) and § 903(a).
422 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
423 382 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967).
424 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
425 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), stating that the "unseaworthi-
ness doctrine has become the principal vehicle for recovery by seamen for injury or death,
overshadowing the negligence action made available by the Jones Act," 46 U.S.C. § 688;
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 97 (1970).
426 Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), cited in Chahoc v. Hunt Shipyard, 431
F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970). Cf. Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d
1229 (5th Cir. 1970), citing most of the leading cases.
427 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
428 358 U.S. 613 (1959); the Halecki case is discussed in Drake v. E.L DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970).
429 Citing West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), discussed in Drake v. E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970).
430 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
431 See Norris, The Law of Seamen (3d ed. 1970).
Cl. Chahoc v. Hunt Shipyard, 431 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970), holding that a drydock
used as such was not a "vessel" and there was no warranty of seaworthiness to be breached.
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come to grief on the facts." '432 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judg-
ment of dismissal of the court below.
483
In Metcalfe v. Oswell Towing Co.,434 a deckhand brought an action
against the owner of a small woodenhulled tug boat for a shoulder
injury he received while attempting to throw a safety line connecting the
bow of a tug to a barge. The trial court rendered judgment for the de-
fendant and the deckhand appealed. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the evidence supported the finding that the tug was
seaworthy and that the deckhand had failed to prove any negligence
on the part of the owner of the tug. Also it was established that the
shipowner had satisfied the requirement of maintenance and cure. Sig-
nificantly, the court pointed out that the mere fact that an accident
occurs and a seaman is injured, without more "does not establish that
a vessel is unseaworthy.
485
In Christman v. Maristella Compania Naviera436 an action was
brought involving an alleged breach of a charter party for a certain
vessel. It was stated that the agent, in signing a contract without au-
thority, had breached a warranty of authority which warranty resembles
the warranty of workmanlike service arising from a contract between
a shipowner and a stevedore.437
The court then rejected the defendant's argument that recovery
of an agent's misrepresentation of his authority is founded "on the tort
of deceit," and said, "We accept, instead, the majority view of the
courts in the United States and England that when an agent signs a
contract he impliedly warrants that he has authority to make the con-
432 Citing Offshore Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959), which is
relied on in Neill v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 426 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Peck v. United
States Steel Corp., 315 F. Supp. 905 (D. Minn. 1970), citing many of the leading cases in-
cluding Offshore Co. v. Robison supra, and West v. United States, supra note 429.
433 Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969).
434 417 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
435 Citing Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra, S.A., 314 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1963).
In Di Paola v. International Terminal Operating Co., 418 F.2d 906 (1969), the district
court had granted a motion for summary judgment made by a stevedore when a suit was
brought in admiralty for damages for injuries suffered by a longshoreman when bags of
coffee fell upon him while he was sweeping the floor of a warehouse on the pier.
The court of appeals held that the district court had not been presented with a com-
plete and accurate record with respect to the relationship between the stevedore which
stacked the bags of coffee in the warehouse and the employer of the longshoreman and
accordingly the case would be remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
438 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
437 Citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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tract. .."' this warranty arises from the contract which the agent has
signed on behalf of his principal."48
The warranty of authority is not unlike the warranty of workman-
like services arising from a contract between a shipowner and a
stevedore .... 44o Recovery on the warranty of workmanlike services
is cognizable in admiralty because the contract on which it is based is
maritime in nature. Here too, the warranty should be cognizable in
admiralty because the contract on which it is based is concededly
maritime in nature.441
Consequently, the motions to dismiss made by the defendant were denied
"in all respects."
In a personal injury action brought against a shipowner by an
injured shore worker, McCown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,442it
appeared that the plaintiff was engaged in a complex technical operation
requiring specialized shipyard equipment put aboard a vessel by the
shipyard and was actually doing work which had never been done by
seamen nor considered a part of a seaman's hazard. This was held not
to be "a seaman's work" at the time of the injury. Consequently
the plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery from the shipowner for
breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.
Furthermore, it did not appear that the ship was "in navigation"
at the time of the accident since the vessel was undergoing extensive
repairs, renewals and renovations, including an overhaul of her main
propulsion engines and accordingly, there could be no recovery by the
plaintiff in an admiralty proceeding. The appellate court affirmed.448
In the course of its opinion, the court quoted from the leading
Supreme Court decision in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.4" where the
standard to govern this type of action was stated: "He [the seaman] is
subject to the rigorous disciplines of the sea, and all conditions of his
service constrain him to accept, without critical examination and without
protest, working conditions, and appliances as commanded by his supe-
rior officers."445
438 Citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329 (1957).
439 Citing Mechem, Agency § 325 (4th Ed. 1952).
440 Citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
441 Christman v. Maristella Compania Naviera, 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
442 293 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. Va. 1967).
443 405 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1969).
444 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
445 McCown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 293 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. Va. 1967), quoting
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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It was clear that the plaintiff McCown was not a member of the
ship's crew, but was an employee of the Newport News Ship Building
and Dry Dock Company and was working aboard the vessel on behalf
of this company. To bring himself within the warranty of seaworthiness,
it was essential for the plaintiff to establish the fact that he was engaged
upon the ship's work since basically he was a shore worker. In point of
fact, he was classified as a "rigger" engaged at the time in a part of a
very complex and technical operation which was not at all a part of the
seaman's regular duties.
From the facts that were adduced in the case, it was quite clear
that the vessel was not "in navigation," since at the time it could not have
been operated under its own power nor did the ships' officers and crew
participate in the work that was being done, gave no orders nor super-
vised its progress. Quoting Latus v. United States446 the court said,
We can not agree * * * that a ship is progressively returned to service
as to those parts of her on which the necessary restoration had been
done. The warranty of seaworthiness has never been divided into frag-
ments; a ship is either fit for duties in all respects, or she is not fitted
at all.447
The court then distinguished certain of the cases that had been
cited on behalf of the plaintiffs, specifically, Lawler v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co.,44' Allen v. Union Barge Line Corp.,"9 and Morrell v. United
States,4"' wherein the vessels had been in the shipyard for a short time
for minor repairs, or for routine maintenance, or for an annual inspec-
tion. Accordingly, summary judgment was rendered for defendant
company.
In the case of Mroz v. Dravo Corp.,45' the plaintiff, a ship's cook,
sought recovery for an aggravated illness, namely emphysema which
she had contracted during her employment by the defendant corporation.
The court was of the opinion that the plaintiff should have had a trial
on the merits and that certain jury questions were presented, citing
Butler v. Whiteman.452 The basis for plaintiff's ailment was that fumes
446 277 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960).
447McCown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 293 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. Va. 1967).
448 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1960).
449 239 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. La. 1965).
450 193 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
451 293 F. Supp. 499 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
452 356 U.S. 271 (1958); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
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from the diesel engines constantly permeated the ship's galley and her
quarters causing her malady. Referring to the responsibility of the
captain for the members of his crew, the court observed that "unques-
tionably, a master has paternal responsibility to the members of his
crew. The defendant, through its captains and doctor, occupies a position
of guardianship to seamen as the wards of the admiralty.""45 In con-
clusion the court said that "plaintiff was entitled to maintenance until
she was cured as far as possible." '454
In Wilkes v. H. M. Wrangell and Co.,455 a longshoreman brought
an action against certain vessel owners for damages for personal injury
alleged to have occurred as a result of the negligence and failure to
provide a seaworthy vessel. A motion for summary judgment was filed
on behalf of the vessel owners, but this was denied on the basis that
there had been no showing of prejudice by a failure to bring the action
within the two years that the Delaware Statute of Limitations provided.
Although recognizing that generally in determining what constitutes
laches, founded on undue and prejudicial delay, a court in a suit in
admiralty will have recourse to the time limitation fixed by the anal-
ogous state statute of limitations. Here there was no evidence that the
vessel owners had been damaged by the delay in bringing the action.
The court held that the presumption of prejudice which the libellant
was required to disprove was actually rebutted by the record. Accord-
ingly, the motion for summary judgment was denied.456
In Solet v. M/V Capt. H. V. Dufrene,457 the court examined with
great particularity the warranty of seaworthiness and found that a sea-
man who brought this action against the owner of a fishing trawler had
been injured when a winch broke rendering the vessel unseaworthy. The
court rejected the argument that since the charter of the vessel was "bare-
boat" the vessel owner did not warrant seaworthiness to the person having
the charter. Thus the court described this as "surely wrong on its face."
The court cited Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc.,45 as a leading precedent.
453 Citing Spellman v. American Barge Line Co., 176 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1949), and see
Williston Contracts, §§ 626, 1018A, 1086A, 1564A (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
454 Mroz v. Dravo Corp., 293 F. Supp. 499 (W.D. Pa. 1968) at 508.
455 293 F. Supp. 522 (D. Del. 1968).
456 Wilkes v. H.M. Wrangell & Co., 293 F. Supp. 522 (D. Del. 1968).
457 303 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. La. 1969).
458 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
A vessel's unseaworthiness might arise from any number of individualized
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In Miller v. Union Barge Line Corp.,459 a longshoreman brought
an action for injuries sustained while on board a barge belonging to one
defendant and chartered to another. The court held that before a bare-
boat charter could relieve the owner of liability, there would have to
be a complete and outright transfer of ownership as described in Guzman
v. Pichirilo.4' Here, the indemnity already paid the injured plaintiff
was greater than the damages being claimed. Consequently, although
there was judgment for the plaintiff, there could be no recovery of dam-
ages.
In Zoldan v. American Export Lines,461 the seaman had given a
"general" release and accordingly, there was no recovery. While recog-
nizing that releases must be scrutinized with care, in this instance, the
written release was so complete that there was no reservation or possible
reservation of any rights whatsoever.
Finally, in Fernandes v. United Fruit Co.,462 the court granted a
motion to quash process against a vessel since there had been an election
between proceeding against the ship or taking the remedy provided by
the Jones Act with right of jury trial against the employer; however,
the seaman could not have both.
These cases demonstrate the significant differences between strict
liability, breach of the constructive warranty and absolute warranty.
Basically, the product must be shown to be defective if there is to be
recovery on theories of either strict liability or constructive warranty.
There is no such requirement where a breach of the warranty of sea-
worthiness is alleged. Liability under this warranty is constantly being
expanded, as the most recent cases clearly demonstrate.463 Repeatedly,
circumstances. Her gear might be defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew
unfit. The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage might be
improper.
Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165.
Cf. Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 319 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La. 1970).
459 299 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
460 369 U.S. 698 (1962).
461 302 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
462 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969) ; the court cited in support, Plamals v. S.S. Pinar
Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928) and Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
463 As the Supreme Court of the United States has said in one of its most recent
pronouncements in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 97 (1970) squarely over-
ruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) a precedent of 85 years standing:
Nonseamen on the high seas could generally recover for ordinary negligence,
but even this was virtually denied to seamen under the peculiar maritime doctrine
of The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 S. Ct. 483, 487, 47 L. Ed. 760 (1903) ...
Since that time the equation has changed drastically, through this Court's
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it has been emphasized that this liability is absolute.
transformation of the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship into an absolute
duty not satisfied by due diligence. See, e.g., Malnich v. Southern S.S. Co., supra;
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926, 4 L. Ed. 2d 941
(1960). The unseaworthiness doctrine has become the principal vehicle for recovery
by seamen for injury or death . . . and it has achieved equal importance for long-
shoremen and other harbor workers to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended
because they perform work on the vessel traditionally done by seamen. Seas Ship-
ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946).
Cf. Epling v. M.T. Epling Co., 435 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1970) where the court cites the
Moragne case, supra, and distinguishes it.
A number of other recent decisions are noteworthy, as, for example: Hellenic Lines
Limited v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) extending protection of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1920) to a Greek seaman who was injured on a Greek vessel in the port of New
Orleans. The contract of employment was made in Greece, and the ship owner was a Greek
corporation which had its largest office in New York and whose 95% shareholder lived
in Connecticut. It was mutually agreed that Greek law was to govern and claims were to
be adjudicated by a Greek court. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the ma-
jority, in an uncanny opinion, held for the seaman.
A dissenting opinion filed by Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Stewart, distinguished by its clarity, logic and adherence to precedents such as
Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) and McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), reflects the Congressional intent that statutes such as the
Jones Act should "apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would
be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law;" it reads in part:
I dissent from today's decision holding that a Greek seaman who signs articles
in Greece for employment on a Greek-owned, Greek-flag vessel may recover under
the Jones Act for shipboard injuries sustained while the vessel was in American ter-
ritorial waters. This result is supported neither by precedent, nor realistic policy,
and in my opinion is far removed from any intention that can reasonably be as-
cribed to Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The dissent then discussed Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), also invoked by
the majority, and concluded:
Today's decision suggests that courts have become "mesmerized" by "contracts,"
and notwithstanding the purported eschewal of a "mechanical" application of the
Lauritzen "test," they have lost sight of the primary purpose of Lauritzen which, as
I conceive it, was to reconcile the all-embracing language of the Jones Act with
those principles of comity embodied in international and maritime law that are de-
signed to "foster amicable and workable relations." 345 U.S., at 582, 73 S. Ct. at 928.
Lauritzen, properly understood, should, I submit, be taken to focus the judicial in-
quiry on the purpose of Congress and the presence or absence of an adequate basis
for the assertion of American jurisdiction, when that purpose may be furthered by
application of the statute in the circumstances presented.
The lower federal courts have also been active in extending liability for breach of the
warranty of seaworthiness:
Guidry v. Texaco, Inc., 430 F.2d 781 (1970), citing Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki,
supra note 425; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., supra note 383; Weyer-
haeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
Noble v. Bank Line, Ltd., 431 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Oliveras v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1970), citing inter alia Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, 362 U.S. 539, to the effect that the duty to furnish "a seaworthy ship is absolute in
the sense that negligence need not be shown."
Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970), citing
the leading cases, where the court observed in humorous vein:
With almost ironic coincidence this, as the earlier one of Gutierrez, is a bean-
worthy case. Burrage, a Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka pseudo seaman, was injured on a
New Orleans wharf while working as a longshoreman in the employ of Stevedore
during the discharge of Shipowner's SS Ciudad de Nieva when he slipped on a
coffee bean that had come from the ship's cargo earlier that morning or the day be.
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This bears out the prediction in a leading treatise on contract law
(Williston) that the Supreme Court of the United States would continue
its extension of the protection afforded to the "wards of the admiralty
courts" the outer limits of which seem not to have been reached as yet.
PRODUCT LIABILITY AND "LONG-ARM" STATUTES
One of the remarkable developments in connection with product
liability litigation is the broadening jurisdictional policy manifested
by the so-called "long arm" statutes. 4 ' Among the most recent cases
dealing with this question is Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.465 There, a product
liability action was instituted by certain apartment house owners against
a New York corporation which manufactured plastic hair curlers.
When the curlers ignited, they caused a fire which damaged plaintiffs'
apartment building in Charleston, South Carolina. Outside of the sale
of the curlers through a local chain store, the manufacturer was not
engaged in any activity in South Carolina although he was served with
process pursuant to a state statute. 6
Thus, there were two basic questions raised by the attempt to ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer, an out-of-state non-
resident: First, a state statute or rule of law would have to be invoked
"permitting personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant under the
particular circumstances";467 Second, the statute or rule must not exceed
the limits upon a state's jurisdiction fixed by the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation or construction of the Constitution of the United States.468
fore. The District Court in a judge trial held Shipowner liable for substantial dam-
ages and rejected Shipowner's plea of contributory negligence and its claim against
Stevedore for WWLP [warranty of workmanlike performance] indemnity under
Ryan. (Footnotes omitted.)
The appellate court affirmed judgment as to recovery by the injured plaintiff, but re-
versed as to recovery over from the stevedore.
Drake v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Law v.
Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), citing most of the leading cases;
Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970) : "Unseaworthiness liability
is 'essentially a species of liability without fault.'"
Cf. Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., 426 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Mitchell v. Ameri-
can Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Wheeler v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 431 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1970) ; In re Marine Sulphur Transport Corp., 312 F. Supp.
1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Interstate Steel Corp. v. S.S. Crystal Gem, 317 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
44 11 Williston, Contracts, § 1292B (3d ed. Jaeger 1968).
465 304 F. Supp. 1247 (D. S.C. 1969).
466 South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, § 12-23.14; cf. UCC § 10.2-806.
467 Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1247 (D. S.C. 1969).
468 As in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; McGee
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After a review of a number of cases dealing with the question
of what constitutes "doing business," the federal court quoted the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina in Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co.,469
to the effect that no universal formula has been devised to determine
what constitutes "doing business" by a foreign corporation within a
given state so as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state.
Only the facts in a particular case will resolve this question.470
The court points out that the more recent decisions of both federal
and state courts have gradually broadened the jurisdiction of the latter
and this seems especially true in product liability cases.47' A continuing
trend is clearly discernible. Quoting an opinion rendered by the Su-
preme Court of Arizona,472 the court commented: "A rule limiting
jurisdiction to defendants who 'purposefully' conduct activities within
the state cannot properly be applied in product liability cases in view
of the fortuitous route by which products enter any particular state. '
Along the same lines, the court discussed the leading Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Company,474where the factual situation was substantially simi-
lar to that in the instant case. In both Arizona and Illinois, the jurisdic-
tion of the local courts was upheld.475 Concluding that it, too, had
jurisdiction, the court denied a motion to dismiss or to quash return of
service of summons. 476
In another significant case, Eyerly Aircraft Company v. Killian,477
v. International Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
These cases are discussed in Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970) as is also the significant Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 IlM. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
469 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960).
470 Jones v. General Motors Corporation, 197 S.C. 129, 14 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
471 Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); cf.
State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242 (1946).
472 Id., citing Cummins, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1964).
473 Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
474 22 1l1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; it is interesting to note that Illinois was the
first state to enact the so-called "single-act statute" or, as more colloquially described,
"long-arm statute," Illinois Civil Practice Act § 17, Ml. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17. Many juris-
dictions have adopted similar legislation, 11 Williston, Contracts, § 1292B (3d ed. Jaeger
1968).
475 The court remarked: "The United States Supreme Court has not commented on
these cases, or, apparently, upon cases involving similar facts." Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.,
304 F. Supp. 1247 (D. S.C. 1969).
476 Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1247 (D. S.C. 1969).
477 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Texas had jurisdiction
under its "long-arm" statute in a case filed by the injured plaintiff in
a federal district court in Texas against an Oregon manufacturer of an
amusement ride used in Dallas. The defendant corporation contended
that its connection with Texas was insufficient to support in personam
jurisdiction.
Holding that the defendant had "engaged in business" in Texas,
even though it did not maintain a regular place of business there and
did not have a designated agent to receive service of process, the court
summarized the following as grounds for exercising jurisdiction:
1. Sales and deliveries of amusement devices and parts therefor
directly into Texas;
2. Extension of credit in the State;
3. Retention of liens on the item sold;
4. Filing such liens with State and County authorities pursuant
to local law;
5. Servicing machines located within the State; and
6. Solicitation of business in Texas. 478
Since these connections with the State were, as the court found, "both
continuous and substantial," the manufacturer came within the terms of
the statute. The court then declared that the growing trend is to hold a
corporation answerable when "it introduces its product into the stream
of interstate commerce if it had reason to know or expect that its product
would be brought into the state where the injury occurred. ' 479
Citing with approval Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling
Manufacturing Company,80 wherein a similar statute was held to permit
Cf. Florida Towing Corp. v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 426 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1970), holding
that Florida's "long arm" statute, F.S.A. § 48.181, did not make defendant "amenable to
service"; dismissal of action affirmed: Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d
211 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Bollard v. Volkswagenwerke, A.G., 313 F. Supp. 126 (D.C. W.D. Mo.
1970). In Dawkins v. White Products Corp., 317 F. Supp. 53 (D.C. Miss. 1970) the court
observed, quoting Eyerly Aircraft supra:
When construing a state 'Long Arm' statute, a federal court in a diversity case
is required under the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1933, 304 U.S. 64,
58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, to give the statute the same construction as would the
highest court of that state. Walker v. Savell, 5 Cir. 1964, 335 F.2d 536, 540.
414 F. 2d at 598-599.
478 Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting from
Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (1969).
479 414 F.2d at 596.
480 124 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1963).
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a product liability action in Minnesota against an Ohio corporation
which had manufactured a boiler which was eventually transported to
Minnesota, the court held that such statutes should be given as broad a
construction as constitutional limitations will permit. The Oregon man-
ufacturer of the amusement device was held amenable to suit in
Texas."'
An example of the attempt by a federal District Court to determine
the pertinent state law is furnished by Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 48 2 where, when a truck driver was killed, the surviving widow
brought an action alleging negligence and breach of warranty on the
part of the manufacturer. The tire had blown out and, in addition to
causing the death of the driver, injured the relief driver and caused
considerable property damage to the truck. The court examined the cases
decided by the North Carolina courts since, pursuant to the decision
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 8 state law would govern. The court
concluded that in spite of some indications to the contrary,484 Wyatt v.
North Carolina Equipment Co.4"5 was still the leading precedent where
breach of warranty is alleged and a privity "requirement" still persists.
Recognizing that certain federal courts "have exercised great
freedom in their interpretations of the applicable state law," the court
481 Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
In Dawkins v. White Products Corp., 317 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Miss. 1970), the court
cites Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, supra, but concludes that it does not have jurisdiction.
Cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Bollard
v. Volkswagenwerke, A.G., 313 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Mo. 1970), where the court observed:
It has, for instance, been widely held that a corporation entering into a con-
tract contemplating significant activities or effects in another state is prima facie
reasonably subjected to the jurisdiction of that state. See, e.g., Corporate Develop-
ment Specialists, Inc. v. Warren Teed Pharmaceuticals, 102 N.J. Super. 143, 245
A.2d 517. Further, state law controls the issue of whether a foreign corporation is
amenable to service within the state. Jennings v. McCall Corp. (C.A. 8) 320 F.2d
64. And recent Missouri cases indicate that Missouri has adopted the "minimum
contacts" doctrine as the standard by which amenability of service is to be deter-
mined. See Slivka v. Hackley, Mo., 418 S.W.2d 89; Adams Dairy Co. v. National
Dairy Products (W.D. Mo.) 293 F. Supp. 1164; Seven Provinces Ins. Co. v. Com-
merce and Industry Ins. Co. (W.D. Mo.) 306 F. Supp. 259.
482 304 F. Supp. 1262 (D. N.C. 1969).
483 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
484 Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967) ; Menden-
hall v. Carolina Garage, Inc. 4 N.C. App. 226, 166 S.E.2d 513 (1969) ; cf. Terry v. Double
Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964), where there is an exhaustive
survey of the diminishing vitality and significance of the so-called privity requirement, al-
though the plaintiff was not permitted to recover when illness resulted from noxious matter
in a soft drink; lack of privity was considered decisive. This, unfortunately, seems to repre-
sent an exercise in retrogression when most jurisdictions are striving to afford the con-
sumer greater protection. See Williston, Contracts §§ 998 et seq. (3d ed. Jager 1964).
485 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960).
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quoted an opinion ventured by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as
to the law of Texas where there had been no decision by the supreme
court of that state:
The Court is forced, therefore, to look to 'all available data;' for
example, 'to such sources as the Restatements of Law, treatises and law
review commentary, and the majority rule,' keeping in mind that it
must 'choose the rule which it believes the state court, from all that is
known about its methods of reaching decisions is likely in the future
to adopt.'4 6
A defective wheel chair caused its occupant an injury and when
this action was brought against the manufacturer, the defense of lack
of privity was interposed. Reasoning by analogy, the court, in Putman
v. Erie City Manufacturing Co.,4 7 concluded that the Texas courts would
not find privity a bar to recovery since in the food cases, notably Jacob
E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,4 " privity had been discarded.
Still more striking, however, was the manner in which the First
Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of privity in Mason v. American
Emery Wheel Works,4" 9 where Mississippi law was to be applied. The
supreme court of that state had unequivocally held in an early case that
privity was a prerequisite.49 Nevertheless, the federal court con-
cluded that because of the trend in other states, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, when an appropriate case is presented, "will declare itself
in agreement with the more enlightened and generally accepted modem
doctrine."
Absent any specific precedent discarding privity in North Carolina,
the court heeded the admonition in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
Walsh,'4 ' and declined to speculate as to what the law will be. Nor would
it "embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine
which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant."4 2 Sum-
mary judgment for the defendant manufacturer was accordingly
granted.493
An unfortunate example of the failure of a federal court to seek
486 Putman v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F.2d 911, 917 (5th Cir. 1964).
487 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
488 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
489 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
490 Ford Motor Co. v. Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928).
491 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944).
492 Id. at 823.
493 Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 304 F. Supp. 1262 (D. N.C. 1969).
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guidance as to what a state court would hold under a given set of facts
is furnished by Green v. American Tobacco Company."4 The case was
originally brought in a federal District Court by the widow of a cancer
victim whose death was caused by smoking cigarettes. From a judgment
for the defendant company, the widow appealed and the case was re-
ferred to the Supreme Court of Florida for an advisory opinion49 upon
petition for rehearing.49 Based on the state court's opinion, the federal
appellate court reversed and remanded. Upon a new trial, judgment
was rendered in favor of the manufacturer which was reversed by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals." 7 However, upon a rehearing en banc,
the panel decision was overruled, and the trial court's judgment was
affirmed per curiam. "' As was to have been expected, there was a power-
ful and well reasoned dissent in which three judges, including the Chief
Judge, joined. The basic criticism was that the case should again have
been certified to the Supreme Court of Florida for further elucidation,
and that a failure to do so was a failure to make a proper determination
of Florida law. As one of the dissenting justices so aptly said:
The one inescapable consideration is that a jury found as a fact
that Mr. Edwin Green, Sr. died of primary cancer of the lung, caused
from smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes. The finding was affirmed by
this Court.499 The decisive point is that when a jury so found there
simply remained no further strict liability factual issue in the case.
This Court one time certified the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida to settle a narrow question of Florida law. That Court re-
sponded. It later took occasion to state exactly what its reply stood for,
to-wit, "Green can be summarized as a case which applied a rule of
absolute or strict liability to the manufacturer of a commodity who had
placed it in the channels of trade for consumption by the public gen-
erally," quoted in the prior opinion.500
Yet, our Court, en banc, is now about to hold that he who sells for
profit a product which caused the dread disease of cancer and also
caused that ultimate of all dreads, death itself, can wiggle out of it by
convincing a lay jury in a swearing match among super-scientists that
such a product may somehow be reasonably safe for personal consump-
tion by the general public. Because I do not believe that the Supreme
Court of Florida would approve such a result, I persist in my refusal
to do so. 5° 1
494 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969).
495 154 So. 2d 169 (1963) ; certification is provided for under F.S.A. § 25.031, FLORIDA
STATUTES 1959.
496 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) ; 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
497 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
498 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed and criticized in 13 Williston, Contracts
§ 1564 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970) and in Part I of this article in note 219.
499 Citing 304 F.2d 70 (1962) and 325 F.2d 673 (1963).
50o Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
501 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1167 (5th Cir. 1969).
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In the second dissenting opinion, the following appears:
My position, then, is a dual one. First I reject the idea that the
enlightened Supreme Court of Florida will tolerate a commercial system
that sells with impunity ostensibly innocuous products, but which in
fact have lethal consequences.
Second, the question is so vital to Florida that the State should be
given the opportunity to fashion its own policy standard through the
available, workable mechanism of certification.
On all scores I therefore dissent. 5
02
The final case in this section involves the applicability of the Massa-
chusetts "long-arm" statute 0 3 which has, as yet, not been before the
Supreme Judicial Court of that state. In deLeo v. Childs, 504 a Massa-
chusetts resident brought an action against certain residents of New
York in the federal district court for Massachusetts alleging breach of
contract. What had transpired was that the plaintiff was retained as
architect for the design and construction of "a nursing home complex"
on land owned by the defendants on Martha's Vineyard.
When the defendants attempted to terminate their contract with the
plaintiff, he filed this action based on diversity of citizenship and al-
leged that defendants were engaged in the "transaction of business"
in Massachusetts which involved construction work "to be performed
on ... real property owned by the defendants" in Massachusetts. Defen-
dants contended that the statute was inapplicable since they were not
''transacting any business" or engaged in construction of a building on
land in Massachusetts. Rejecting these arguments, the court laid down
the basic guidelines:
As a guide in construing statutes a court should be mindful of the pur-
poses for which the statute was enacted. Long-arm statutes are expres-
sions of a legislative attempt to create a new basis of jurisdiction which,
within constitutional limitations, will afford the citizens of a State a
forum for causes of action arising from the activities of non-residents
within the State.505 These statutes codify a new type of personal
jurisdiction based on activities deemed more relevant than mere physi-
cal presence of a defendant or his agent in a State. As long as constitu-
tional limits are not crossed, a court should interpret the statute to
effectuate a State's legitimate desire to protect its citizens. In this case
no constitutional infirmity is claimed and none is perceived. 50 6
After citing McGee v. International Life Insurance Company,"67
502 Id. at 1170.
503 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A (1968).
504 304 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1969).
505 Citing Note, "The Virginia 'Long Arm' Statute," 51 Va. L. Rev. 719 (1965).
5065 deLeo v. Childs, 304 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1969).
507 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the court concluded that "the service of process made upon defendant
was sufficient," 508 although the defendant had pointed out that the "long-
arm" statute had been enacted after the actual service of process. "This
question," said the federal court, "appears never to have been decided
by any Massachusetts State court," although similar statutes have been
held to be retroactive in New York and Illinois, citing in support
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.5"9 and Nelson
v. Miller,51 and quoting the leading case, Hanscom v. Malden & Mel-
rose Gas Light Co.5" as follows:
The general rule of interpretation is that all statutes are prospective
in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retrospective
appears by necessary implication from their words, contexts or objects
when considered in the light of the subject-matter, the pre-existing
state of the law and the effect upon existent rights, remedies and
obligations. * * * It is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and
evidence, in short, those relating to remedies and not affecting sub-
stantive rights, that commonly are treated as operating retroactively,
and as applying to pending actions or causes of action.512
While the deLeo case does not deal with a defective product, it
is nevertheless of considerable interest since it concerns real estate
and could well lead to the conclusion that if a defective product were
to be installed in a house, as in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,51 the
jurisdiction of the state where this occurred might be invoked to hold
the manufacturer of the product.
In the preceding pages, we have examined and discussed the great
changes that have brought about increased consumer protection finally
leading to an astonishing, but welcome, extension and expansion of the
warranties of quality.
Law writers have had a field day with product (or as it is often
described "products") liability.514 In the past two or three decades, there
508 deLeo v. Childs, 304 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1969).
509 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965), cert. denied sub nom., Est-
wing Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
510 11 11. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
511 220 Mass. 1, 107 N.E. 426 (1914).
512 Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied by the court).
513 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
514 Among the numerous articles that abound in the literature of product liability, the
following may be deemed of general interest: Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons
Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. Rev. 343 (1929) ; Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) ; Condon, Progress of
Products Liability Law, 31 N.Y.S. B. Bull. 119 (1959) ; Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers and Vendors, 10 Minn. L Rev. 1 (1925); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
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has been a veritable deluge of articles, comments and notes discussing,
analyzing and often criticizing judicial opinions which have dealt with
this topic. Nor is this activity on the wane. With the warranty of habit-
ability being adopted by an increasingly respectable minority of the
jurisdictions-perhaps soon to be a majority-further impetus has
been given to the propagation of legal literature.
THE EMERGING WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
So firmly was the doctrine of merger embedded in the law of real
property that only express warranties embodied in the deed had any
validity. These express warranties have been defined by the Supreme
Court of the United States:
An affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing sold, (not
uttered as a matter of opinion or belief,) made by the seller at the time
of sale, for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the facts
affirmed, and inducing him to make the purchase, if so relied on by the
purchaser, is an express warranty.
515
However, there has been a growing impatience with the doctrine
of caveat emptor which has manifested itself not only in product liability
cases but in the sale of new houses as well. While merger still applies
quite generally in sales of real property, an implied warranty concept
19 Minn. L. Rev. 752 (1935); Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6
Villanova L. Rev. 1 (1960) ; Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119
(1958); Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negli-
gence? 24 Ten L. Rev. 928 (1957); Hotes, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 Cleveland-
Marshall L. Rev. 81 (1959) ; Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Du-
quesne U. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturers Liability? Recent
Developments, 48 Marquette L. Rev. 293; Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive War-
ranty, 39 Notre Dame Lawyer 501 (1964) ; Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fit-
ness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493 (1962) ; James, General Products
-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957);
James, The Liability of Manufacturers for Faulty Goods, The Journal of Business Law 287
(1960) ; Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 Va. L. Rev. 134 (1937) ; Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law,
24 Tenn. L. Rev. 952 (1957) ; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale LJ. 554 (1961) ; Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The
Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 963 (1957) ; Plant, Strict Liability of Manu-
facturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938 (1957) ; Prosser,
The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 69 Yale L.J. 1099
(1960) ; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 50 Minnesota
L. Rev. 791 (1966); Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky.
L.J. 388 (1933); Ruud, Manufacturers' Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales
Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 251 (1961); Skeel, Advertised-Product
Liability, 8 Cleveland-Marshall L Rev. 2 (1959) ; Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite
for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. Rev. 551 (1941); Willis, Product Liability Without
Fault, 15 Food, Drug, Cosmetic LJ. 648 (1960); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L
Rev. 614 (1955). Cf. Noel, Defective Products, 38 Tenn. L Rev. 1 (1970).
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has been developed in an increasing number of decisions where the
vendor of the new home is also the builder.
Merger
Before examining the individual cases wherein a constructive
warranty was held to exist, a brief discussion of the doctrine of merger
seems desirable, since this has been the principal obstacle to holding
vendors of houses liable. No remedy was available for a breach by
the vendor of any promise contained in the contract but omitted in the
deed since the doctrine of merger was held applicable:
It is well settled that all agreements, whether oral or written,
entered into by and between the parties to a deed prior to its execution
are presumed to have been merged in the deed in the absence of plead-
ing and proof that references thereto were omitted from the deed through
mistake, accident, or fraud, and after delivery and acceptance of a
deed in performance of a contract for the purchase or sale of land the
deed is regarded as a final expression of the agreement of the parties
and the sole repository of the terms on which they have agreed.516
And in Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Wabash-Randolph Corp., "' the
Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The principles in reference to merger are well settled. If the terms
of a contract for sale of real estate are fulfilled by the delivery of the
deed there is a merger, but if there are provisions in the contract which
delivery of the deed does not fulfill, then the contract is not merged in
the deed as to such provision and the contract remains open for the
performance of such terms.5 1s
Another court has stated the principle as follows: "A deed executed
and delivered in proper form is the complete contract and merges all
oral negotiations up to the time of delivery."
519
However, in Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney,520 the court held
that there was no merger in the deed of conveyance of a home of certain
oral promises to install off-site utilities. This question was posed by
515 Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575 (1887), quoting with approval Osgood v. Lewis,
2 Har. & G. (Md.) 495 (1829) which in turn has been quoted by the Fourth Circuit in
Distillers Distributing Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1950).
With respect to goods, the Uniform Commercial Code has adopted substantially the
same principle in § 2-313.
516 Union Producing Co. v. Sanborn, 194 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Tex. 1961); cf. Fitz-
patrick v. Allied Contracting Co., 24 M. 2d 448, 182 N.E.2d 183 (1962).
517 384 IIl. 78, 51 N.E.2d 132 (1944).
518 Citing Weber v. Aluminum Ore Co., 304 Ill. 273, 136 N.E. 685 (1923).
519 Lincoln v. Wells, 350 P.2d 589 (Okla. 1960).
520 56 Cal. 2d 676, 365 P.2d 401 (1961).
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the court: "Did the parol evidence rule preclude the receipt of extrinsic
proof of an oral agreement to install offsite improvements adjacent
to the real property sold by defendants to plaintiff?" The court answered
its own question: "No. Evidence of an oral promise to install off-site
improvements may be given to show an inducement to buy a lot adjacent
to such improvements, since such promise is an independent, collateral
one which need not be included in the deed conveying the property."
52
'
This doctrine of merger is related, however, to the question of
whether or not a term of the contract of purchase or sale is merged
into the deed. However, there is a different question when a party claims
mutual mistake whereby no contract was ever formed. On this subject
the court, in Labasin v. President Realty Holding Corp., 22 stated that
rescission on the ground of mistake was not subject to a defense that
ti,ez, had been merger of the contract of sale into the deed, declaring:
It is my opinion that in view of the nature of this action the terms
of the contract did not merge into the deed. The authority cited by the
defendant as to mergers all relate to actions in law in which the ag-
grieved party affirms the contract but charges a breach thereof or
demands rights flowing therefrom. Here the aggrieved party claims
lack of mutuality and disclaims the existence of the contract. The relief
demanded is proper in form and scope.523
As to merger, it has generally been held that it is a factual question
of intent, Hammontree v. Tenworthy.124 In Mitchem v. Johnson,525the
court specifically rejected the suggestion that in the absence of express
warranties, there could be no implied warranties that the structure is
suitable for the purposes ordinarily intended.
Caveat Emptor
It is of course, well understood that the majority of jurisdictions
still adhere to the archaic and demoded concept of caveat emptor in
the sale of houses :526 However, in Caldwell v. Wells,1 2 the court held
521 Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney, 56 Cal. 2d 676, 678, 365 P.2d 401, 402 (1961)
(citations omitted).
522 209 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1960).
523 13 Williston, Contracts, §§ 1535-1600 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
524 1 Ariz. App. 472, 404 P.2d 816 (1965).
525 7 Ohio 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
526 In support, the following are deemed representative: Druid Homes v. Cooper, 272
Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) ; Diaz v. Jeyes Co., 143 So. 2d 554 (Fla. App. 1962) ; Wal-
ton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753, 131 S.E.2d 655 (1963) ; Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Il. App.
2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963) ; Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961);
Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959), 78 A.L.R.2d 440 (1961).
527 228 Ore. 389, 365 P.2d 505 (1951).
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that this rule was not applicable where defendant made a separate
promise to drill a well which would furnish plaintiffs with a satisfactory
supply of drinking water for domestic use.
Two Canadian cases deserve special attention as they illustrate
the confusion which surrounds caveat emptor, especially where its
application is being increasingly restricted-as indeed it should. In
the first, Dalladas v. Tennikat,"2' strict application of caveat emptor was
adhered to by the court. Two years later, in Chevertkin v. Romanelli 29
the court declined to apply the strict doctrine of caveat emptor. The
cases specifically dealt with a question of merger and in the former,
Dalladas, it was held that the contract of purchase and sale was merged
in the deed, whereas in the latter, the holding was that there was no
merger. Certainly, these decisions have done nothing to lessen the con-
fusion which plagues this field of law.
Over the years, it has been increasingly perceptible that the courts
are not in sympathy with caveat emptor, especially in the sale of a
house that has not been completed. The rationale used being that this
is more a warranty of workmanlike construction than a warranty of the
quality of realty as is indicated in certain judicial language used by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in Hill v. Polar Pantries:...
It seems to be well settled that where a person holds himself out
as specially qualified to perform work of a particular character, there
is an implied warranty that the work which he undertakes shall be of
proper workmanship and reasonable fitness for its intended use, and,
if a party furnishes specifications and plans for a contractor to follow on
a construction job, he thereby impliedly warrants their sufficiency for
the purpose in view .... 531
With this background, and the realization that the courts have been
faced with precedents1 2 in many respects as inhibiting in their limita-
528 O.W.N. 169 (1958), noted in 5 Canada B.J. 92.
529 O.W.N. 199 (1960), noted in 5 Canada B.J. 92.
530 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
531 Id. at 271, 64 S.E.2d at 888, quoted in Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d
830, 833, 329 P.2d 474, 476 (1958).
532 Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961), is typical. There,
the court said: "The great weight of authority does not support implied warranties in real
estate transactions but requires any purported warranties to be in written contractual form
.... No decision has come to our attention which permitted recovery by the vendee of a
house upon the theory of implied warranty." Id. at 416, 131 So. 2d at 885. It is interesting
to note that had the decisions occurred a few years later, there would have been several
decisions holding that a recovery could be had on the implied warranty where the subject
matter of the sale was real property, specifically, a new house being sold by the builder.
See cases cited supra note 526.
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tions upon implied warranties as those involved in product liability
cases, the leading decisions which have broken with the past will be
reviewed.
The Early Cases
It was in England (where all the mischief started53 3) that a break
with the past was announced in Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd.534
The plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant for
the purchase of a house and lot, although the building had not yet been
finished. When construction was completed, the plaintiff occupied the
dwelling but was obliged to leave because a penetrating dampness
permeated the house endangering his health, according to medical ad-
vice. The court, making a somewhat artificial distinction between an
incomplete house and one that was complete at the time of purchase,
suggested by way of obiter dictum that upon purchase of an incomplete
house, there was an implied warranty of fitness for habitation, whereas,
in the case of a completed house, the buyer could, if he chose, obtain
an express warranty.
Six years later, in Perry v. Sharon Development Co. Ltd.53 the
court took a further step and declared that the implied warranty of
quality and fitness would apply to a house that was substantially com-
plete, although the so-called incomplete house doctrine of the Miller case
was the one that was ostensibly being applied. This is, of course, a rather
dubious distinction, and one that cannot be approved.
It was not until some twenty years later that an American juris-
diction undertook to follow in a guarded manner the example furnished
by the English cases. In Vanderschrier v. Aaron,536 the court decided that
when the buyer purchased a home not yet completed, the builder-vendor
would be liable for a failure to connect properly a house sewer line with
a city sewer. In consequence, the house and cellar were flooded with
sewage which caused a most unhealthy condition and a decidedly un-
wholesome odor in the home. As the court observed: "In the law of En-
gland, we find the rule to be that, upon the sale of a house in the course
533 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(Ex. 1842).
534 [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
535 [1937] 4 All Eng. Rep. 390 (C.A.), noted in 81 Sol. J. 1021.
536 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
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of erection, there is an implied warranty that the house will be finished
in a workmanlike manner.
537
The reference to the "workmanlike manner" clearly indicates that
the court has in mind the possibility of an implied warranty not neces-
sarily connected with a sale. In that respect, it is reminiscent of some
of the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in a distinct
and different field, namely in regard to the warranty of seaworthiness.
There, certain cases deserve particular mention: Italia Societa per Azioni
di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,533 Alaska Steamship Co. v.
Petterson"5 9 and Reed v. The Yaka.540 In these cases, the Supreme Court
found specifically that when a stevedore undertakes to load or unload
cargo he makes an implied warranty that he will do so in a workmanlike
manner. A breach of this warranty causes liability to arise on the part
of the stevedore towards the steamship company. This warranty, it must
be emphasized, is clearly an implied-in-law warranty or, perhaps better
said, a constructive warranty.
The year after the decision in the Vanderschrier case,54' the Su-
preme Court of Washington in Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc.,542 also
adopted the Miller exception to the general rule and held that where a
contractor undertook to build a house for a buyer, the contract embodied
an implied warranty of fitness for human habitation referring to an
implied warranty that the work which he undertakes shall be of proper
workmanship and reasonable fitness for its intended use. 4'
In Colorado and Oklahoma, the courts undertook to permit a
homeowner to recover where the construction of the house, or the con-
dition of the land, was faulty or deficient. Three significant cases were
decided under Colorado law: F & S Construction Co. v. Berube,544 which
followed Glisan v. Smolenske545 in 1963, and was in turn followed by
Carpenter v. Donohoe46 a year later. In Oklahoma, two significant
537 Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 341-2, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1957),
citing Perry v. Sharon Development Co., Ltd., [1937] 4 All Eng. Rep. 390 (C.A.).
538 376 U.S. 315 (1964), supra note 377 and text following.
589 347 U.S. 396 (1953).
540 373 U.S. 410 (1963), supra note 420.
541 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
542 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
543 Id. Cl. 7 Williston, Contracts §§ 926, 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963); 11 Williston
§§ 1399A, 1399B; 12 Williston § 1506A; 13 Williston § 1565.
544 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963).
545 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
546 154 Colo. 178, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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decisions, Leigh v. Wadsworth4 7 and Jones v. Gatewood,54 s departed
from the beaten track and granted recovery to the aggrieved homeowner.
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.
But a truly gargantuan stride was taken in what has become a gen-
uine classic in the field of real estate sales of new houses by the builder-
vendor. The case, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.549 marks the beginning
of a new era. Boldly, and burning its bridges behind it, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey unanimously overruled the earlier decisions and
held that a warranty would be implied in law, and that lack of privity
would be no defense to the builder-vendor of a defective home. This
was indeed a giant step forward.
Harking back to an earlier precedent, Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.55 where public policy played the decisive role, the su-
preme court emphasized the fact that in the Schipper case, a corporate
builder of homes, specializing in planned communities on an interna-
tional scale, was actually engaged in mass production. One of the resi-
dences so constructed was sold to a homeowner who eighteen months
later leased it to a family for one year. Two days after the tenants
moved in, their infant son was badly scalded when he turned on the hot
water faucet in the bathroom lavatory which was not equipped with a
"mixing valve." The child was hospitalized for seventy-four days dur-
ing which several skin graftings were performed. Plaintiff tenants
brought this action against the builder and the manufacturer of the
heating unit."'
In a carefully considered and comprehensive opinion, the court
rejected the defenses of no warranty and lack of privity, and decided, on
the issue of negligence, the case should have gone to the jury. After an
examination of a number of cases from other jurisdictions and several
precedents from New Jersey, the court commented significantly:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and
547 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
548 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963).
549 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
550 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
551 The court cited numerous examples of cases where the end product included parts
and accessories furnished by other manufacturers stating that "such manufacturers may be
held accountable under ordinary negligence principles [citing MacPherson] as well as under
expanding principles of warranty or strict liability [citing Henningsen and other cases],"
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 82, 207 A.2d 314, 321 (1965).
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just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for
keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient dis-
tinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit
the law should be readily rejected as they were step by step in
Henningsen and Santor.552 We consider that there are no meaningful
distinctions between Levitt's mass production and sale of homes and the
mass production and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent over-
riding policy considerations are the same. That being so, the warranty
or strict liability principles of Henningsen and Santor should be carried
over into the realty field, at least in the aspect dealt with here .... 553
552 In regard to the various defenses interposed by the builder-vendor, short shrift has
been made of their validity:
In fact, in the past in these situations we have not only tended to severely
limit the factual area of recovery but we have shown an equally ready disposition
to adopt and embrace the whole dreary legal apparatus and rhetoric so long em-
ployed in these situations to narrow or prevent any recovery at all. Some of these
open sesame phrases are: whether there was privity or lack of it; whether the de-
fect was latent or patent; whether or not the offending product was sold in the
original package; whether a vague requirement of a "higher degree of care" might
sometimes alter the application of "the rule"; or whether the defective product did
or did not contain an "inherently or imminently dangerous" article or substance
harmful to humans. We do not exhaust the list. There are other equally impressive
and ominous catch-phrases, and awesome have been some of the semantic bogs
negotiated by ours and other appellate courts when in particularly harsh cases they
have attempted by such artificial "exceptions" to get around the barrier imposed by
their own equally artificial "general rule" of nonliability.
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 127, 90 N.W.2d 873, 877
(1958), discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne
U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
553 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). The Henningsen case is stated
in some detail and discussed extensively in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fit-
ness for Use, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493 (1962).
In the language of the court, "it is our opinion that an implied warranty of merchant-
ability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends to the pur-
chaser of the car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying or using it with
his consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by such persons is not
within the anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability of an auto-
mobile for ordinary highway operation. Those persons must be considered within the dis.
tributive chain." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra at 414-5, 161 A.2d at 100.
Cf. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968); the opinion cites Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors and includes a
comprehensive review of the most significant cases (as, for example, Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian) where strict liability has been invoked. Beginning with Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937), and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940),
to determine "choice-of-law" and the resultant "conflict-of-law" rules to be applied, the
court finds that Texas has adopted "the tort theory of strict liability," relying on Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964).
Of particular interest is the part of the opinion headed:
Policy Considerations
Initially, we review the policy considerations behind strict liability. With the
technological revolution and modem marketing practices of this Century, Americans
now enjoy the conveniences of many modern and beneficial products. These benefits
to the many, however, have come at a high cost to a few. To combat the serious
injuries visited on this minority, the law has re-examined its traditional reasons for
imposing liability. This "rethinking" has caused many courts to abandon the tradi-
tional negligence analysis and impose liability without fault on the maker who puts
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When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model . . . he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its
implied representation that the house will be erected in reasonably work-
manlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. He has no
architect or other professional adviser of his own, he has no real
competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in the
nature of things, largely superficial, and his opportunity for obtaining
meaningful protective changes in the conveyancing documents prepared
by the builder vendor is negligible. If there is improper construction
such as a defective heating system or a defective ceiling, stairway and
the like, the well-being of the vendee and others is seriously endangered
and serious injury is foreseeable. The public interest dictates that if
such injury does result from the defective construction, its cost should
be borne by the responsible developer who created the danger and who
is in the better economic position to bear the loss rather than by the
injured party who justifiably relied on the developer's skill and implied
representation.
The arguments advanced by Levitt in opposition to the application
of warranty or strict liability principles appear to us to lack substantial
merit. Thus its contention that caveat emptor should be applied and the
deed viewed as embodying all the rights and responsibilities of the
parties disregards the realities of the situation. Caveat emptor developed
when the buyer and seller were in an equal bargaining position and
they could readily be expected to protect themselves in the deed. Buyers
of mass produced homes are not on an equal footing with the builder
vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than are
automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in the bill of
sale. Levitt expresses the fear of "uncertainty and chaos" if responsibil-
ity for defective construction is continued after the builder vendor's de-
livery of the deed and its loss of control of the premises, but we fail to
see why this should be anticipated or why it should materialize any
more than in the products liability field where there has been no such
result.
Levitt contends that imposition of warranty or strict liability
principles on developers would make them "virtual insurers of the
safety of all who thereafter come upon the premises." That is not at all
so, for the injured party would clearly have the burden of establishing
that the house was defective when constructed and sold and that the
defect proximately caused the injury. In determining whether the house
the product into the stream of commerce. The justification for rejecting privity is
based on the realization that our technological society, with its proliferation of
products and mass advertising, demands judicial protection of the consumer who
has neither the capacity nor opportunity to discover latent dangers in products.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1
(1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966).
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 848-49 (1967). Prosser cites, inter alia,
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963),
noted in Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer's Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 49 A.B.A.J. 701
(1963) ; Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability?, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1964) ;
Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 Notre Dame Lawyer 501 (1964) ;
Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493 (1961).
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was defective, the test admittedly would be reasonableness rather than
perfection.5 5 4
It is worthy of note that although the 1936 edition of Williston,
Contracts, upon which Levitt places reliance, stated flatly that there are
no implied warranties in the sale of real estate, the 1963 edition took
quite a different approach. In this edition, Professor Jaeger pointed
out that although the doctrine of caveat emptor is still broadly applied
in the realty field, some courts have inclined towards making "an ex-
ception in the sale of new housing where the vendor is also the developer
or contractor," since in such situation the purchaser "relies on the im-
plied representation that the contractor possesses a reasonable amount
of skill necessary for the erection of a house; and that the house will
be fit for human dwelling." 5 5 In concluding his discussion of the
subject, the author remarked that "it would be much better if this en-
lightened approach were generally adopted with respect to the sale of
new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work
and jerry-building that has become perceptible over the years." '5 6
After concluding that the action against the manufacturer of the
heating unit would have to be dismissed since there had been proved
neither negligence nor breach of any implied warranty, the court re-
versed the judgment of dismissal as to the defendant builder-vendor of
the house and remanded the case for trial. 57
554 As was pointed out in Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545
(1962), the comparable warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods means only that
the article is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is sold and does not imply "absolute
perfection"; cf. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d
826 (1964).
555 Citing 7 Williston, Contracts §§ 926, 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
556 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90-5, 207 A.2d 314, 325-28 (1965).
Citing and quoting 7 Williston, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
557 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), quoting Henningsen
supra note 553.
The court cited Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corporation, 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.
2d 81 (1963), where the plaintiff's daughter, a passenger in an airplane, died as a result
of its crash. Suit was instituted by the plaintiff as administratrix against the maker of the
airplane, and against a company which supplied one of its component parts, for alleged
breach of implied warranty of fitness. The court held that previous New York decisions dis-
carding the requirement of privity should be extended so as to hold the maker of the air-
plane accountable under warranty or strict liability principles to remote as well as immediate
users. But it declined, at least for the present, to do the same with respect to the maker of
the component part, pointing out that "adequate protection is provided for the passengers
by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer which put into the market the completed
aircraft." 240 N.Y.S.2d, at 595, 191 N.E.2d, at 83. Similarly, here the plaintiffs have been
afforded wholly adequate protection by the holding as against Levitt, the company which
built and marketed the house with the allegedly defective design and installation. 44 N.J.
70, 97-8, 207 A.2d 314, 329.
"In any event," said the court, "we believe that under the plaintiff's own proofs it may
not fairly be said that York had either breached any implied warranty, or had failed to
give reasonably sufficient warning and direction, or had failed to exercise the measure of
care required of it." Id. at 98, 207 A.2d at 329. In Goldberg supra, the court cited with
approval Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U. L. Rev.
1 (1963).
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The Most Recent Cases
In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,5 ' a residential property was sold and the
buyers instituted an action for rescission of the contract. The trial court
held that there are no implied warranties in a sale of real property, re-
lying on early precedents which can hardly be regarded as of continu-
ing validity.559 According to the evidence, water seepage from an irriga-
tion ditch which ran under the lot and garage purchased by the plaintiffs
caused the house being purchased to be uninhabitable.56 Although the
builder was experienced and aware of the soil and seepage conditions,
he had failed to take the necessary precautions to make the basement
waterproof.56' The appellate court quoted at length from the earlier
precedent discussed above562 and held that the judgment of the lower
court in favor of defendant builder would be reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial.5" As the court pointed out:
558 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
559 Principally, Levy v. C. Young Construction Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717
(1957), affd on other grounds, 26 NJ. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958), and Steiber v. Palumbo,
219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
560 Since there had been a representation that the basement was waterproof, and a
non-disclosure of the presence of the ditch on the property, the issue of constructive fraud
was also presented on appeal.
561 The courts specifically rejected the contention of the builder that the plaintiffs had
actually put the water in the basement, but found instead that he was aware of the condi-
tion, had failed to disclose it contrary to his duty to do so and had assured plaintiffs that
they were acquiring a "quality" home built of the finest materials and by the finest work-
men, in short "that the house would be fit for human habitation."
562 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). On pages 326, 327, 207
A.2d, the New Jersey Court has collected recent authorities from other jurisdictions limit-
ing or departing from the rule of caveat emptor and adds: ". . . Whether or not the cases
may be differentiated, they undoubtedly evidence the just stirrings elsewhere towards recog-
nition of the need for imposing on builder vendors an implied obligation of reasonable
workmanship and habitability which survives delivery of the deed .... " Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 66, 415 P.2d 698, 709 (1966).
The decision in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra, is vitally significant because:
1. It exemplifies the definite change in the attitude of the courts toward the applica-
tion of the doctrine of caveat emptor in actions between the builder-vendor and purchaser
of newly constructed dwellings;
2. It draws analogy between the present case and the long-accepted application of im-
plied warranty of fitness in sales of personal property; and
3. The opinion had the unanimous approval of the participating justices.
563 In so doing, the court reviewed the later cases with similar holdings and quoted
from Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), as follows:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near
completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incon-
gruous. To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter
cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it ....
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements
between builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly constructed buildings,
completed at the time of contracting. There is an implied warranty that builder-
vendors have complied with the building code of the area in which the structure
is located. Where, as here, a home is the subject of sale, there are implied war-
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The implied warranty of fitness does not impose upon the builder
an obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without de-
fects, and defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would not warrant
rescission. But major defects which render the house unfit for habita-
tion, and which are not readily remediable, entitle the buyer to rescis-
sion and restitution. The builder-vendor's legitimate interests are
protected by the rule which casts the burden upon the purchaser to
establish the facts which give rise to the implied warranty of fitness,
and its breach.56 4
Shortly thereafter, in Waggoner v. Midwestern Development,"'
the Supreme Court of South Dakota followed the leaders in departing
from the narrow strictures of property law, and held for the plaintiff
homeowners in their action for damages against the builder-vendor.
What had happened was that a continuous flow of water seeped into the
basement of the new house which the plaintiffs had bought, much to
their dismay and chagrin. In the words of the Court:
There is, however, a notable lack of harmony in decisions as to the
existence of an implied warranty of fitness upon the sale of a new house
or one to be erected or in the course of erection.5 66
In the 1963 edition of Williston on Contracts, there is a review of
recent decisions bearing on the question of implied warranty and dis-
cussion of the recent trend of decisional law. The author says:
Over the years, the number of cases which apply the rule of caveat
emptor strictly appears to be diminishing, while there is a distinct
tendency to depart therefrom, either by way of interpretation, or excep-
tion, or by simply refusing to adhere to the rule where it would work
injustice. * * * Broad as is the application of the principle of caveat
emptor in sales of real estate, a few courts have been inclined to make
an exception in the sale of new housing where the vendor is also the
developer or contractor. In such a situation, a purchaser relies on the
implied representation that the contractor possesses a reasonable amount
of skill necessary for the erection of a house; and that the house will be
fit for human dwelling. * * * It would be much better if this enlightened
approach were generally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses
ranties that the home was built in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habita-
tion.
Id. at 83-4, 388 P.2d at 402.
564 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966). Citing Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
565 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967).
566 Such a distinction seems neither logical nor realistic if a warranty of habitability
is to be implied in law. And it does appear that such a warranty is essential if the pros.
pective homeowner's rights are to be protected as is well recognized in Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). See also supra note 563.
Some of the cases involving building contracts are decided upon the theory of an im-
plied warranty that the contractor will build the structure without material defects and
that it will be suitable for the purpose for which it was constructed. Caldwell v. Wells, 228
Ore. 389, 394 n.1, 365 P.2d 505, 507 n.1 (1961).
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for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-
building that has become perceptible over the years. 567
After reviewing some of the more liberal holdings, the court adopted
their reasoning in the following paragraph:
We conclude that where in the sale of a new house the vendor is
also a builder of houses for sale there is an implied warranty of reason-
able workmanship and habitability surviving the delivery of deed. The
builder is not required to construct a perfect house and in determining
whether a house is defective the test is reasonableness and not perfec-
tion.5 68 The duration of liability is likewise determined by the standard
of reasonableness. 569
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Humber v. Morton,70 followed
its earlier decision in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capp, 7' and the deci-
sions from other jurisdictions holding that there is an implied warranty
which accompanies the sale of new houses, and quoted at length from
Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton.5"2 The Court commented: "By offer-
ing the (new) house for sale as a new and complete structure appellant
impliedly warranted that it was properly constructed and of good mate-
rial and specifically that it had a good foundation . ,573
Very recently, the Supreme Court of Washington in an appropri-
ately styled case, House v. Thornton,574 also reviewed the authorities,575
and concluded that the purchasers of a new home were entitled to main-
tain an action against the vendor-builders to rescind the sale when ma-
terial defects developed. The trial court entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs and defendants appealed. Affirming, the court declared:
567 Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 807-8 (S.D. 1967),
quoting 7 Williston, Contracts 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
568 Citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
569 Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (S.D. 1967).
570 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
571 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
572 110 U.S. 108 (1884).
573 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. 1968), quoting Loma Vista Develop-
ment Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
574 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
575 Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967) ; Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) ; Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.
78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
Current literature on the subject overwhelmingly supports this idea of an implied war-
ranty of fitness in the sale of new houses. See Property-Implied Warranty of Fitness in the
Sale of a New House, 71 W. Va. L. Rev. 87 (1968) ; The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer:
The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 Cornell L.Q. 835 (1967); Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1961); The Case For an
Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 Geo. L.J. 633 (1965). See also,
Denver L. Rev. 379 (1966) ; 26 U. Pitt. L. Rpv. 862 (1965) ; 44 N.C.L. Rev, 236 (1965) ; I
Cal. West. L. Rev, 110 (1965),
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The rule of implied warranty of fitness covering new construction
or the sale of a partially constructed building, although closely related
to the sale of a brand-new residence falls short of meeting the precise
issues in the instant case. Frequently, the prospective purchaser of a
house buys it with knowledge of its defects and makes no point whatever
of their existence before consummating the deal . . . . But the present
trend is toward the implied warranty of fitness and away from caveat
emptor when it comes to the things which rightly affect the structural
stability or preclude the occupancy of the building.
After citing the case of Sain v. Nelson,576 which followed the case
of Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc.,577 the court added:
Nothing, of course, can be said to be more vital to a dwelling than
the stability of its foundation. ... The evidence amply supported the
court's conclusion that the sliding, slipping, and cracking of the foun-
dation and floors and the cracking and shifting of the walls, although
due not to fault in design, installation or workmanship, but rather to
the instability of the ground and terrain upon which the house stood,
rendered the premises unusable as a dwelling.578
While the court found that there had been no fraud or misrepresen-
tation, and there was no indication that the defendants failed to design
and erect the building properly or that they used defective materials,
or in any way rendered an unworkmanlike performance, yet the fact
remained that they sold and delivered for occupancy to the plaintiffs a
brand-new $32,000 residence which turned out to be unfit for habita-
tion. Certainly, these builder-vendors had a far better opportunity to
examine the stability of the site and to determine the kind of a founda-
tion to build than did the purchasers. If they failed to install the proper
foundation and as a result the house began to crumble, there can hardly
be any doubt where the liability should be placed. As the Supreme
Court of Washington said:
To borrow an idea from equity, of the innocent parties who suf-
fered, it was the builder-vendor who made the harm possible. If there
is a comparable standard of innocence, as well as of culpability, the
defendants who built and sold the house were less innocent and more
culpable than the wholly innocent and unsuspecting buyer. Thus, the
old rule or caveat emptor has little relevance to the sale of a brand-new
house by a builder-vendor to a first buyer for purposes of occupancy.579
Kentucky has also joined the march of progress in Crawley v. Ter-
576 57 Wash. 2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960).
577 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
578 House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435, 457 P.2d 199, 203 (1969) (emphasis sup-
plied).
579 Id. at 435-36, 457 P.2d at 204 (emphasis supplied).
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hune, decided last year. Here, too, the plaintiffs, husband and wife,
who had purchased a new home from the builder-owner were greatly
annoyed to find that their basement was anything but dry. The court
held that there was at law "an implied warranty in the sale, and the
evidence showed a breach of it." ' The judgment as to the builder-
vendor was affirmed.
And in Vermont, the supreme court, after citing and discussing
the leading cases, has concluded that "the law will imply a warranty
against structural defects" in the sale of a newly-constructed house by
the builder-vendor. In Rothberg v. Olenik, s' a newly-built residence
developed a number of serious defects such as cracks in the walls, in-
adequate support for the foundation walls, uneven floors not properly
finished and lack of waterproofing. Rejecting the defendant's argument
of caveat emptor, the court commented:
In the case at bar the defendant's argument that there are sound
reasons for retaining the doctrine of caveat emptor in this case lacks
substantial merit. A reading of the cases in this area of the law affords
numerous examples and situations illustrating the harshness and in-justice of this ancient common law doctrine when applied to the sale of
of a new house by the builder-vendor.
The law should be based upon current concepts of what is right andjust and the judiciary should be alert to the neverending need for keep-
ing its common law principles abreast with the times. Ancient dis-
tinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit
the law should be readily rejected as they appear to have been step by
step in the cases cited supra.
Thus, in three of the most recent cases dealing with implied warran-
ties in the sale of new housing, Washington, Kentucky and Vermont
have taken the important and necessary stride towards elimination of
the artificial and wholly unrealistic distinction between the sale of par-
tially completed dwellings and new homes.
Oregon will probably join the growing minority since the decision
in Macomber v. Cox5 s2 presages imposition of a duty upon the builder-
vendor by the court on the principles of strict liability. This may well
580 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969), at 745.
581 262 A.2d 467 (Vt. 1970) where the court cites and quotes the cases discussed in 7
Williston, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963) as well as those which appear in the
latest volume, namely, 13 Williston, opus cit. §§ 1565, 1565A (1970), wherein the Third
Edition of Williston is quoted.
582 435 P.2d 462 (Ore. 1967).
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signify the overruling of Steiber v. Palumbo,"3 decided along tradi-
tional lines of no implied warranty in sales of real estate.
As was to have been expected, California has joined the avant
garde in its decisions in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn.
Co.5"4 and Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.5" 5 based on strict tort liabil-
ity. The homes in the development under consideration were mass pro-
duced and reflected the lack of adequate care and planning which re-
sulted in various structural defects. As the appellate court said in
Connor:
Public policy casts its persuasive shadow in this instance and we
believe that low-income home purchasers are entitled to protection
from substantial structural defects which would not be disclosed by a
reasonable inspection. 5s6
Even more significant is the decision in the Kriegler case. The
home that was purchased had been constructed by the defendant in 1951
and instead of installing copper tubing in the heating system, steel was
used because of the shortage occasioned by the Korean conflict. This
deteriorated to the point where it was no longer serviceable and had to
be replaced some eight years later. Nevertheless, the court gave judg-
ment for the plaintiff:
We think, in terms of today's society, there are no meaningful
distinctions between Eichler's mass production and sale of homes and
the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent over-
riding policy considerations are the same. Law, as an instrument of
justice, has infinite capacity for growth to meet changing needs and
mores. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the recent developments
in the field of products liability. The law should be based on current
concepts of what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert to
the never-ending need for keeping legal principles abreast of the times.
Ancient distinctions that make no sense in today's society and that tend
to discredit the law should be readily rejected as they were step by step
in Greenman and Vandermark.5s7
In Wawak v. Stewart,"s' by a sharply divided court, Arkansas
adopted the warranty of habitability.8 ' The plaintiffs, who had bought
583 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
584 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609 (1968).
585 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. App. 1969).
586 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967) at 344.
587 Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752
(1969).
588 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970), quoting 7 Williston, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger
1963).
89 The Court was divided, 4 to 3.
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a new home from the defendant, discovered that when the rains came,
the heating and airconditioning system was fully flooded. In conse-
quence, silt and sand were deposited in various rooms in the house
causing substantial damage to the furnishings. In this case of novel im-
pression, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs for breach
of implied warranty. Affirming, the appellate court observed :59o
The trial court was right. Twenty years ago one could hardly find
any American decision recognizing the existence of an implied war-
ranty in a routine sale of a new dwelling. Both the rapidity and the una-
nimity with which the courts have recently moved away from the harsh
doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of new houses are amazing, for
the law has not traditionally progressed with such speed.591
Yet there is nothing really surprising in the modern trend. The
contrast between the rules of law applicable to the sale of personal prop-
erty and those applicable to the sale of real property was so great as to
be indefensible. One who bought a chattel as simple as a walking stick
or a kitchen mop was entitled to get his money back if the article was
not of merchantable quality. But the purchaser of a $50,000 home
ordinarily had no remedy even if the foundation proved to be so defec-
tive that the structure collapsed into a heap of rubble.592
After citing various law review articles, 593 the court continued:
In 1963 a new edition of Williston's Contracts added its weight to
the movement, pointing out a practical advantage in the new point of
view: 'It would be much better if this enlightened approach were gen-
erally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend
to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-building that has be-
come perceptible over the years.'
In the past decade six states have recognized an implied warranty
590 After reviewing the leading precedents including Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, quoting 7 Williston, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
591 Perhaps the Supreme Court of Arkansas should not have been too amazed at the
speed with which the courts "have moved away from the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor
in the sale of new houses" since all forms of communication and transportation are dis-
playing an enormously increased rate of acceleration in this era of supersonic jets, atomic
and hydrogen energized devices and moon forays.
592 A decidedly similar view was expressed as to implied or constructive warranties
accompanying the sale of new automobiles in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne U.L Rev.
1 (1963); Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness tor Use, 16 Rutgers L Rev.
493 (1962); Williston, Contracts §§ 643, 995A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
593 Several law review articles, of which the earliest was published in 1952, forecast
the new developments. Their titles suggest their contents: Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as
to Fitness of Land For a Particular Purpose, 37 Minn. L Rev. 108 (1952); Bearman,
Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 Vanderbilt L. Rev.
541 (1961) ; Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 53 Georgetown L.J. 633 (1965); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 Cornell L.Q. 835 (1967). See also supra note 575.
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-of inhabitability, sound workmanship, or proper construction-in
the sale of new houses by vendors who also built the structures. 594
Having quoted at some length from several of the earlier prece-
dents,595 the court pointed out:
'The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism
patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices. It does a
disservice not only to the ordinary prudent purchaser but to the in-
dustry itself by lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night
operator and purveyor of shoddy work.'5 96
Thereupon, various arguments advanced by the builder-vendor
defendant were analyzed including the usual suggestion that a change
so drastic should come from the legislature rather than the courts.597
Rejecting this contention, and citing "a famous case '  abolishing the
so-called requirement of privity-"accepted as commonplace through-
out the nation" 599-the court added: "We have no doubt that the modifi-
cation of the rule of caveat emptor that we are now considering will be
accepted with like unanimity within a few years."
Joining the steadily growing number of jurisdictions (of which
Illinois may be one6 "), the supreme court of Arkansas quite simply
594 Quoting 7 Williston, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963) ; the law review arti-
cles referred to by the court are listed supra notes 575, 593.
Citing Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, 415 P,2d 698 (1966) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development Co., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 225 A.L.R.3d 372 (Tex. 1968); House v. Thornton,
457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
As the court points out: "The near unanimity of the judges in those cases is note-
worthy." Of the 36 judges who sat in the six courts of final instance which reviewed these
appeals, there was only one dissent, and that without opinion.
595 Including Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., Humber v. Mor-
ton, and House v. Thornton-all cited supra, note 594.
596 Quoting Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
597 As, for example, in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 107 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81 (1963); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963),
crit. in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1
(1963).
Cl. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1963) with Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Atkinson, the majority concluded
that if injunctive relief was to be granted in cases where there was a breach of a no-strike
clause in a collective labor agreement, this should be done by legislative action. Seven years
later, the Supreme Court re-examined the holding of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson and
concluded that the case was erroneously decided and overruled the decision. Quite clearly,
the Congress did not have to legislate-what the Supreme Court has done, it could undo!
598 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1015 (1916).
599 So described by the court in Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970).
See Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1
(1963).
600 Week v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 111. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
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adopted "the modern rule" which will probably become the weight of
authority in due course: "To sum up, upon the facts before us in the
case at bar we have no hesitancy in adopting the modem rule by which
an implied warranty may be recognized in the sale of a new house by a
seller who was also the builder."' '
The latest jurisdiction to join the steadily growing progressive
minority is Michigan. There, in Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc.,6 . after
quoting from the opinions in the leading cases including Wawak v.
Stewart, supra, the appellate court observed:
The substitution of the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness for
that of caveat emptor in the field of personal property has been firmly
imbedded in our jurisprudence since the Uniform Sales Act and the
recent adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Until recently,
however, the doctrine of caveat emptor has continued to be almost
universally applied to the sale of real property, see 78 A.L.R.2d 446
(Annotation). However, in the past ten years, eight states have moved
away from the theory of caveat emptor and have adopted some form
of implied warranty in the sale of new family dwelling houses. The
There the court held a contract to construct a residence implied a warranty of fitness for
the intended purpose, and that the warranty survived passing of title by deed.
Cf. Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 M. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963).
601 Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970) ; cf. 13 Williston, Contracts § 1565
(3d ed. Jaeger 1970). The Wawak case is discussed in Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat
Emptor or Caveat Venditor? 24 Ark.L. Rev. 245 (1970).
Based on their holdings in product liability cases [See Part I of this article, 46 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 123 (1969)], it is probable that a number of other jurisdictions (in addition
to those cited supra note 594) have held or will hold the builder-vendor liable for defects
in construction, either on the theory of breach of constructive warranty or strict liability
in tort; among these may be included: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Vermont.
602 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970) citing:
Wawak v. Stewart (1970), Ark., 449 S.W.2d 922; Carpenter v. Donohoe(1964), 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399; Bethlahmy v. Bechtel (1966), 91 Idaho 55,
415 P.2d 698; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. (1965), 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314;
Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc. (1967), 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803;
Humber v. Morton (Tex. 1968), 426 S.W.2d 554; Rothberg v. Olenik (1970), Vt.,
262 A.2d 461; House v. Thornton (1969), Wash., 457 P.2d 199.
The court added:
Beginning in 1952, a host of law review articles predicted the trend which the
law was bound to take in doing away with the illogical distinctions between pur-
chasers of personal property and the purchasers of new residential real property.
See Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
37 Minn. L. Rev. 108 (1952) ; Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent
Assaults upon the Rule, 14 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 541 (1961) ; Haskell, The Case for
an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 Georgetown L.J. 633
(1965); Robert, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer; The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 Cornell L.Q. 835 (1967).
As suggested in the 1963 edition of Williston regarding the recent trend:
"It would be much better if this enlightened approach were generally adopted
with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the
sloppy work and jerry-building that has become perceptible over the years." 7 Wil-
liston, Contracts (3d [Jaeger] ed.), § 926A, p. 802.
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states who have joined the vanguard in interring the ancient doctrine
have recognized that in many cases, especially where there are large
developments involved, the individual buyer is not on an equal footing
and is not in a position to bargain at arm's length with the builder-
vendor. The individual purchaser of a newly constructed home is no
more able or competent to inspect for latent defects or to protect himself
than is the buyer of a mass-produced automobile.
The foregoing examination of the case law indicates that a distinct
form of action is emerging which may be known, without reference to
contract or tort, as an action for breach of constructive warranty. 3 And
the constantly growing significance of new housing construction is
perhaps best indicated by the fact that between two and three billions of
dollars were spent for new homes each month during 1969-1970 accord-
ing to the United States Department of Commerce.
And in Louisiana, where the Civil Law controls, the Code expressly
provides that where there is a sale, whether of chattels or realty, there
604are warranties which protect the buyer. The doctrine of redhibition,
as it is called, is defined as "the avoidance of a sale on account of some
vice or defect in the thing sold which renders it either absolutely useless
or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that
the buyer would not have purchased, had he known of the vice."
This article of the code was applied in Sikes v. B&S, Inc.6 5 The
significant point is that under the code the seller "warrants" what he
sells, including real property, so a newly-built house which has defects
or vices renders the builder liable to the purchaser for damages mea-
sured by the reduction in value of the property when the defects devel-
oped which were not apparent at the time of the purchase and which, if
then known, would have prevented the sale. This doctrine applies
equally to the sale of realty and personalty even when the house was
603 Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
citing numerous cases and suggesting that where the "warranty" is imposed by law, even
if the action is framed in contract, it is not limited by any privity requirement and is com-
parable "to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product."
This solution of the difficulties attendant upon the use of either a contract or tort
remedy is strongly advocated in Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39
Notre Dame Lawyer 501 (1964).
Cf. Peck v. United States Steel Corp., 315 F. Supp. 905 (D. Minn. 1970), citing many
of the leading cases including Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) ; In Re
Marine Sulphur Transport Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) citing Montgomery v.
Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
604 La. Civ. Code, Art. 2520 (1952).
605 164 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 1964).
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already completed before the contract of sale was signed.606 This, of
course, furnishes the vendee with the protection to which he is entitled
under modem housing conditions.60 7
While Rhode Island has not committed itself specifically with re-
gard to adoption of the warranty of habitability, its supreme court has
shown an inclination to extend consumer protection. 608 In its most re-
cent case, one of novel impression, Halpert v. Rosenthal, the vendor of
a house sought specific performance or, in the alternative, damages for
breach of contract when the vendee refused to complete the transac-
tion.609 Defendant vendee filed a counterclaim for return of his $2,000
606 Sterbcow v. Peres, 222 La. 850, 64 So. 2d 195 (1953).
607 Loraso v. Custom Built Homes, Inc., 144 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1962).
608 This view is based on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Joslin, joined by Mr.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Roberts, in Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 99 R.I. 518,
209 A.2d 46 (1965). In this product liability case, the plaintiffs had bought a quantity of
feed for their chickens. When this proved unsuitable and defective, they brought an action
for breach of the warranties of merchantability and fitness for use, and the defendant manu-
facturer demurred on the ground of lack of privity. When the trial court sustained the de-
murrer, this appeal followed. Refusing to overrule its earlier decisions on this point, affirm-
ing, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island declared: "In the absence of legislation modifying
the law laid down in those cases [requiring privity] the trial justice did not err in following
them." Id. at 524, 209 A.2d at 49. In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Joslin ably
reviewed the gradual development of exceptions to the doctrine of privity in tort actions,
criticized the suggestion of the principal opinion that legislative action was required and
demonstrated that the change could be accomplished by judicial means:
While a deferral to the legislature in the initiation of changes in matters
affecting public policy may often be appropriate, it is not required where the con-
cept demanding change is judicial in its origins. The requirement of privity in
suits against a manufacturer is such a concept. It is of judicial making and was
first enunciated in Winterbottom v. Wright, [10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842)1 where Lord Abinger said not to insist upon it could result in
"absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit," and Alder-
son, B., opined that "The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those
who enter into the contract . ".. 
If historically there were a distinction between an action in tort and one in
assumpsit for a breach of warranty, I would not be troubled by the dichotomy re-
sulting from our judicial relaxation of the privity requirement in tort cases and
the majority's insistence that any change in that requirement as to cases sounding
in contract must come from the legislature. Such, however, is not the case for in
early times an action for breach of warranty sounded in tort and it was not until
Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Douglas 18, was decided in 1778 that it was settled that such
an action could be brought in assumpsit . . . . I agree with the statement that
"Alteration of the law in such matters has been the business of the . . . courts
.... " Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
I have deemed it advisable to set forth my views notwithstanding that I do
not believe that considerations of public policy justify a departure from our re-
quirement of privity on the facts of this case. How far those considerations will
influence my views in the future must necessarily depend on the cases which may
come before us. I am not yet, however, prepared to adopt a rule of strict liability
which would make every producer a guarantor of the fitness of his product.
Henry v. John Eshelman & Sons, 99 R.L 518, 528, 209 A.2d 46, 51-2 (1965), concurring
opinion.
609 267 A.2d 730 (R.L 1970).
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deposit.610 When the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant,
the plaintiff appealed.
In a skillful and carefully reasoned opinion, Mr. Justice Kelleher,
following the modern enlightened trend, denied and dismissed the ap-
peal. 1' The facts, which were reviewed by the appellate court, indicated
that an agreement was reached whereby a house situated in Providence,
Rhode Island, was sold for $54,000 with a down payment or deposit of
$2,000 being made by the vendee. Three months later, a termite inspec-
tion was made at the instance of the defendant vendee. 1 '
The inspection revealed a rather comprehensive termite infesta-
tion; thereupon, the vendee informed the vendor that he would not com-
plete the transaction. He did not appear for the title closing some six
weeks later. The basic issue was presented on appeal: Is an honest mis-
representation of a material fact upon which there has been reliance a
proper ground for rescission of a contract?61 There being no precedent
in Rhode Island jurisprudence, the court had recourse to other author-
ities, and discussed the arguments of both plaintiff and defendant.
In seeking a directed verdict, the plaintiff contended
* * ' to sustain the charge of fraudulent misrepresentation, some
evidence had to be produced showing that either she or her agent knew
at the time they said there were no termites in the house, that such a
statement was untrue. Since the representations made to defendant were
made in good faith, she argues that, as a matter of law, defendant could
not prevail on his counterclaim.
The defendant concedes that there was no evidence which shows
61o "On February 21, 1967, the parties hereto entered into a real estate agreement
whereby plaintiff agreed to convey a one-family house located in Providence on the south-
easterly corner of Wayland and Upton Avenues to defendant for the sum of $54,000. The
defendant paid a deposit of $2,000 to plaintiff. The agreement provided for the delivery of
the deed and the payment of the balance of the purchase price by June 30, 1967." 267
A.2d 730, 732 (R. 1970).
611 ffalpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730 (R.I. 1970) where the court pointed out: "This
case is unique in that plaintiff made no motion for a new trial. Her appeal is based for
the most part on the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict in her favor on the counter-
claim. She has also alleged that the trial justice erred in certain portions of his charge to
the jury and in failing to adopt some 15 requests to charge submitted by plaintiff." Id. at
732.
612 Several inquiries regarding the presence of termites were addressed to the plain.
tiff and to her real estate agent at different times; both stated there were no termites in the
house.
613 While recognizing that there is authority to the contrary, Mr. Justice Kelleher
adopted the majority rule:
However, the weight of authority follows the view that the misrepresenter's
good faith is immaterial. We believe this view the better one.
267 A.2d 730, 735 (R.L 1970).
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
that plaintiff or her agent knowingly made false statements as to the
existence of the termites but he maintains that an innocent misrepresen-
tation of a material fact is grounds for rescission of a contract where,
as here, a party relies to his detriment on the misrepresentation. 614
The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict and this holding
was affirmed. The appellate court added:
The plaintiff, when she made her motion for a directed verdict,
stated that her motion was restricted to the issue of "fraud." The word
"fraud" is a generic term which embraces a great variety of actionable
wrongs.61 5 It is a word of many meanings and defies any one all-inclu-
sive definition. Fraud may become important either for the purpose of
giving the defrauded person the right to sue for damages in an action
for deceit or to enable him to rescind the contract. 616 In this jurisdiction
a party who has been induced by fraud to enter into a contract may pur-
sue either one of two remedies. He may elect to rescind the contract to
recover what he has paid under it, or he may affirm the contract and sue
for damages in an action for deceit.617
After discussing the difference between a claim for damages for
intentional deceit and a suit for rescission based on reliance on an in-
nocent misrepresentation of a material fact,618 the court commented:
When he denied plaintiff's motion, the trial justice indicated that
a false, though innocent, misrepresentation of a fact made as though of
one's knowledge may be the basis for the rescission of a contract. While
this issue is one of first impression in this state, it is clear that the trial
judge's action finds support in the overwhelming weight of decision
and textual authority which has established the rule that where one
induces another to enter into a contract by means of a material misrep-
resentation, the latter may rescind the contract. It does not matter if
the representation was "innocent" or fraudulent.
In 12 Williston, supra,6 19 § 1500 at 400-01, Professor Jaeger states:
614 Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730 (R.L 1970).
615 Citing LaCourse v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951).
616 Citing 12 Williston, Contracts § 1487 at 322 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
617 Citing Goodwin v. Silverman, 71 R.I. 163, 43 A.2d 50 (1945) ; Robinson v. Standard
Stores, Inc., 52 R.I. 271, 160 A. 471 (1932); Moran v. Tucker, 40 R.I. 485, 101 A. 327
(1917).
618 As the court is careful to point out:
The distinction between a claim for damages for intentional deceit and a claim
for rescission is well defined. Deceit is a tort action, and it requires some degree of
culpability on the misrepresenter's part. Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.) § 100. An
individual who sues in an action of deceit based on fraud has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant in making the statements knew they were false and intended
to deceive him. Cliftex Clothing Co. v. DiSanto, 88 R.I. 338, 148 A.2d 273; Conti
v. Walter Winters, Inc., 86 R.I. 456, 136 A.2d 622. On the other hand, a suit to
rescind an agreement induced by fraud sounds in contract. It is this aspect of
fraud that we are concerned with in this case, and the pivotal issue before us is
whether an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact warrants the granting
of a claim for rescission. We believe that it does.
Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730, 733 (RI. 1970).
619 Supra note 616.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW"
"It is not necessary, in order that a contract may be rescinded for fraud
or misrepresentation, that the party making the misrepresentation should
have known that it was false. Innocent misrepresentation is sufficient,
for though the representation may have been made innocently, it would
be unjust and inequitable to permit a person who has made false repre-
sentations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by
such representations."
Finding that the aforequoted statement is in accord with the rule enun-
ciated by the courts in at least ten other states,620 and the Restatement of
Contracts,621 Mr. Justice Kelleher notes, while some courts require proof
of scienter that the representation relied on is false before declaring an
agreement invalid,62 2 "the weight of authority follows the view that the
misrepresenter's good faith is immaterial. We believe this view the bet-
ter one.
A misrepresentation, even though innocently made, may be action-
able, if made and relied on as a positive statement of fact. The question
to be resolved in determining whether a wrong committed as the result
of an innocent misrepresentation may be rectified is succinctly stated
in 12 Williston, supra,6 23 § 1510 at 462 as follows:
"When a defendant has induced another to act by representations
false in fact although not dishonestly made, and damage has directly
resulted from the action taken, who should bear the loss?"
620 As indicated by the court:
. many courts have also adopted this rule including the following: Lehnhardt
v. City, 105 Ariz. 142, 460 P.2d 637; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Anaya, 78 N.M. 101,
428 P.2d 640; Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398; Hudspeth v. Zorn
(Mo.), 292 S.W.2d 271; Keeton Packing Co. v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 437 S.W.2d
20; Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGrath, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245; Yorke v.
Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912; Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 168
N.W.2d 201; Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E.
700; Berger v. Pittsburgh Auto Equipment Co., 387 Pa. 61, 127 A.2d 334.
267 A.2d 730, 734 (R.I. 1970).
621 This statement of law is in accord with Restatement of Contracts, § 476 at 908
which states:
Where a party is induced to enter into a transaction with another party that
he was under no duty to enter into by means of the latter's fraud or material mis-
representation, the transaction is voidable as against the latter . . ..
Misrepresentation is defined as:
... any manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that,
under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts.
Restatement of Contracts, § 470 at 890-91.
The comment following this section explains that a misrepresentation may be innocent,
negligent or known to be false. A misrepresentation becomes material when it becomes
likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with another
person. Restatement of Contracts, § 470(2) at 891. Section 28 of Restatement of Restitu-
tion is also in accord with this proposition of law that a transaction can be rescinded for
innocent misrepresentation of a material fact.
622 Citing Wilkinson v. Appleton, 28 11. 2d 184, 190 N.E.2d 727 (1963) ; Classic Bowl,
Inc. v. AMF Pinspotters, Inc., 403 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Southern Roofing & Petroleum
Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 725 (D.C. 1968).
623 Supra notes 616 and 619.
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
The question we submit is rhetorical. The answer is obvious.
Simple justice demands that the speaker be held responsible. 624
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant could maintain his coun-
terclaim for the return of his deposit.
The plaintiff's final substantive argument has a familiar ring:
Even if an innocent misrepresentation without knowledge of its falsity
may under certain circumstances justify relief by way of rescission, the
defendant cannot prevail here because of a merger clause.625 Earlier
cases discussed above advanced this contention with varying degrees of
success; 626 rejecting this argument with his customary vigor and logic,
Mr. Justice Kelleher observed:
The plaintiff argues that in order to enable a purchaser to rescind a
contract containing a merger clause because of a misrepresentation,
proof of a fraudulent misrepresentation must be shown. We find no
merit in this argument.
If, as plaintiff concedes, a merger clause, such as is found within
the sales contract now before us, will not prevent a rescission based on
a fraudulent misrepresentation, 627 there is no valid reason to say that it
will prevent a rescission of an agreement which is the result of a false
though innocent misrepresentation where both innocent and fraudulent
misrepresentations render a contract voidable.6 28 As we observed be-
fore, the availability of the remedy of rescission is motivated by the
obvious inequity of allowing a person who has made the innocent mis-
representation to retain the fruits of the bargain induced thereby.
In these days of equivocation and hesitant speech, it is refreshing
to see the Supreme Court of Rhode Island take a firm stand on the na-
624 The court reviews several cases holding that innocent misrepresentations where
material will warrant intervention by the courts: Williams v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141
N.W.2d 650 (1966); Watkins v. Grady County Soil & Water Cons. Dist., 438 P.2d 491
(Okla. 1968) ; Ham v. Hart, 58 N.M. 550, 273 P.2d 748 (1954), where the court said:
Whether the party thus misrepresenting a material fact knew it to be false, or
made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or false, is wholly imma-
terial; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally
in morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be posi-
tively false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a material fact by mis-
take, it is equally conclusive; for it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the
other party.
58 N.M. 550, 552, 273 P.2d 748, 749, quoting I Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 272 (14th
ed. 1918).
625 This provision immediately precedes the testimonium clause and provides that the
contract ". .. contains the entire agreement between the parties, and that it is subject
to no understandings, conditions or representations other than those expressly stated herein."
626 Supra Merger, p. 28, especially notes 516-532.
627 In Bloomberg v. Pugh Bros. Co., 45 R.L 360, 121 A. 430 (1923), the contract
contained a merger clause similar to the one before us. Such a provision, this court said,
would not bar the introduction of evidence designed to show that the contract had been
procured by fraud.
628 Citing Restatement of Contracts, § 476.
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ture of innocent misrepresentation as being an example of absolute li-
ability,62 9 not a species of fraud, actual or constructive: 3
Before leaving this phase of plaintiff's appeal, we think it appro-
priate that we allude to the tendency of many courts to equate an
innocent misrepresentation with some species of fraud. Usually the word
"fraud" connotes a conscious dishonest conduct on the part of the mis-
representer. Fraud, however, is not present if the speaker actually
believes that what he states as the truth is the truth. We believe that
it would be better if an innocent misrepresentation was not described as
some specie o /fraud.63 l Unqualified statements imply certainty. Reli-
ance is more likely to be placed on a positive statement of fact than a
mere expression of opinion or a qualified statement. The speaker who
uses the unqualified statement does so at his peril. The risk of falsity
is his. If he is to be liable for what he states, the liability is imposed
because he is to be held strictly accountable for his words. Responsibil-
ity for an innocent misrepresentation should be recognized for what it is
-an example of absolute liability rather than as many courts have
said, an example of constructive fraud.6 32
The court reviewed several other objections registered by the plain-
tiff as to the conduct of the trial; rejecting one of these, Mr. Justice
Kelleher commented:
The plaintiff states that the trial judge should have instructed the
jury that misrepresentations had to be proved by "clear and convincing
evidence" and not by a "preponderance of the evidence" as they were
charged. We disagree. Long ago . . . we stated in clear and express
language that fraud must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
and there is no reason why we should require a higher degree of proof
when the good faith of the misrepresenter is unquestioned. 633
Other allegations of error fared no better; 634 they were all over-
ruled and the plaintiff's appeal was denied."'
629 As to absolute liability, see Warranty of Seaworthiness and Absolute Liability,
supra p. 3.
630 See 12 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 45 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
631Emphasis supplied. Cf. 13 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 46 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
632 Citing 12 Williston, Contracts, § 1510 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970); 1 Harper & James,
The Law of Torts § 7.7 (1956).
633 Citing Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 39 R.I. 146, 98 A. 1 (1916).
634 The court said:
The plaintiff complains that the trial justice erred when he told the jury that
defendant could recover even though he might have been "negligent" in signing the
sales agreement. The thrust of this objection is plaintiff's contention that either de-
fendant's neglect to include in the contract a clause which would have protected
his interest in the event termites were found on the property or his failure to have
the premises inspected for termites prevent his recovery of the deposit. Such an
argument is really aimed at the question of whether or not defendant was justified
in relying on the representations made by plaintiff and her agent. We can see noth-
ing patently absurd or ridiculous in the statements attributed to them which would
warrant us in saying that defendant should be denied relief because of his failure to
do what plaintiff now says he should have done. On the record before us, defendant
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Leaseholds and the Warranty of Habitability
A truly astonishing, perhaps amazing extension of the warranty
of habitability appears in the opinion in Javins v. First National Realty
Corporation"' and its companion cases." 7 In each, the individual ap-
pellants rented apartments by written lease in a building in Washing-
ton, D.C. As each of the tenants had defaulted in the payment of rent,
the corporate landlord sought possession. The tenants alleged that the
Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia had been violated re-
peatedly.63
The trial court entered judgment for the landlord; the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed,639 and the tenants appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Reversing
with an opinion at times almost bizarre, not to say weird, the United
States Court of Appeals rode roughshod over the rules of property law
showing its preference for the applicable principles of contract law: °
Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was the conveyance of an
interest in land, courts have usually utilized the special rules governing
real property transactions to resolve controversies involving leases.6
41
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal prop-
erty law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in
land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society; it may
continue to be reasonable in some leases involving farming or commer-
cial land. In these cases, the value of the lease to the tenant is the land
itself.64 2
was amply justified in believing that the home he was purchasing was free of ter-
mites.
267 A.2d 730, 737.
635 Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730 (R.L 1970).
636 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Javins case is cited with approval in Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1970) and Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
637 Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Gross v.
First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
635 Defendant tenants allege that there were "approximately 1500 violations."
639 Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (1968).
640 Referring to Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, at 266 (1960). However, the
Jones case is not actually in point at all.
641 Adverting to the judicial "duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the
facts and values of contemporary life," the court cites Spencer v. General Hospital of the
District of Columbia, 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) stated supra p. 33, and suggests:
Cf. 11 S. Williston, Contracts, 1393A at 461 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968) ("Most of the
leading jurisdictions have not hesitated to undo a judicially committed blunder ...
by employing the same means-judicial decisions") and cases cited therein at n.20.
642 Here, the court adds:
But in the case of the modem apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it
gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the
third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below, or even
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The opinion then discussed the rules governing the interpretation
and construction of "predominantly contractual" covenants in leases
which were described as having "too often remained rooted in old prop-
erty law." ' It was recognized that some courts have realized that the
ancient rules of property law governing leases are no longer appropri-
ate for the complexities of the modern era.644
In our judgment the trend toward treating leases as contracts is
wise and well considered. Our holding in this case reflects a belief that
leases of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like
any other contract.645
Modern contract law has recognized that the buyer of goods and
services in an industrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty
of the supplier to assure that goods and services purchased are of ade-
quate quality.646 In interpreting most contracts, courts have sought to
protect the legitimate expectations of the buyer and have steadily
widened the seller's responsibility for the quality of goods and services
through implied warranties of fitness and merchantability .... 47
Today most states 48 as well as the District of Columbia 49 have
codified and enacted these warranties into statute, as to the sale of
goods, in the Uniform Commercial Code.650
Implied warranties of quality have not been limited to cases in-
volving sales. The consumer renting a chattel, paying for services, or
buying a combination of goods and services must rely upon the skill and
honesty of the supplier to at least the same extent as a purchaser of
goods. 51 Courts have not hesitated to find implied warranties of fitness
in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his apartment. When Amer-
ican city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek shelter today, they seek a well known
package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and
ceilings, but also heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
428 F.2d 1071, 1074.
643 Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) at 1074.
7 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 32, especially § 926 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
644 Citing Medico-Dental Building Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 418, 132
P.2d 457, 462 (1942) ; 1 American Law of Property § 3.11 at 202-205 (A. Casner ed. 1952) ;
The California Lease-Contract or Conveyance?, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 244 (1952); Friedman,
The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 Cornell L.Q. 165 (1947).
045 Emphasis supplied. "We believe," the opinion adds, "contract doctrines allow courts
to be properly sensitive to all relevant factors in interpreting lease obligations."
As is also recognized, the civil law views the lease as a contract and in the court's
judgment, "that perspective has proved superior to that of the common law."
646 The court suggests:
See generally 8 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 983-989 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1964) ; W.
Prosser, Torts § 95 (3d ed. 1964).
64T See Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L.
Rev. 493 (1962); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314, 2-315 (1968).
648 In fact, all except Louisiana.
649 Citing 28 D.C. Code, Subtitle I (1967).
050 Supra note 643, 647.
651 For the leading cases, see Part I of this article, note 4, p. 124.
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and merchantability in such situations. In most areas product liability
law has moved far beyond "mere" implied warranties running between
two parties in privity with each other.652
The rigid doctrines of real property law have tended to inhibit the
application of implied warranties to transactions involving real es-
tate. 53 Now, however, courts have begun to hold sellers and developers
of real property responsible for the quality of their product. For exam-
ple, builders of new homes have recently been held liable to purchasers
for improper construction on the ground that the builders had breached
an implied warranty of fitness. 54 In other cases courts have held build-
ers of new homes liable for breach of an implied warranty that all local
building regulations have been complied with.655
Most recent decisions indicate the extension of liability to parties
other than the vendor where residential real estate developments show
defective or improper construction. 656
Despite this trend in the sale of real estate, many courts have been
unwilling to imply warranties of quality, specifically a warranty of
habitability, into leases of apartments. Recent decisions have offered no
convincing explanation for their refusal; rather they have relied without
052 Citing e.g. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960); Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty,
39 Notre Dame Lawyer 501 (1964).
To these citations might well be added Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded?, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
653 Citing "Fegeas v. Sherill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958) ; 7 S. Williston, Con-
tracts § 926 at 800-801, § 926A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963)."
654 Citing "Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., S.Dak., 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, Idaho, 415 P.2d 698 (1969) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. n. 641;
Carpenter v. Donohoe, Colo., 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Loraso v. Custom Built Homes, Inc.,
La. App., 144 So. 2d 459 (1962). Other cases still continue the older limitation on the ven-
dor's liability to homes sold before construction is complete. See, e.g., Hoye v. Century
Builders, Wash., 329 P.2d 474 (1958)."
More recent decisions that might well have been added to the first category cited
above include: Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970), stated supra notes 588-602;
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969) stated supra note 580; Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) stated supra notes 570-573; House v. Thornton, 457
P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969) citing Hoye v. Century Builders, supra and discarding the notion
that construction of the home must not have been completed if the warranty is to attach.
The House case is stated supra notes 574-579.
655 Citing Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) ; Annot.,
110 A.L.R. 1048 (1937).
656 Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968) (in bank); Chief Justice Traynor's excellent opinion utilizes
tort doctrines to extend liability beyond the immediate seller. Cf. Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) supra note 587. Both cases are discussed in 13
Williston, Contracts, § 1565 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
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discussion upon the old common law rule that the lessor is not obligated
to repair unless he covenants to do so in the written lease contract .... 657
In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the obliga-
tions imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing code, and
must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of habitability. In
the District of Columbia, the standards of this warranty are set out in
the Housing Regulations.
The opinion, as rendered by Mr. Justice J. Skelly Wright, then
suggests that the common law must recognize an obligation on the land-
lord's part to keep his premises in a habitable or tenantable condition.
With this conclusion there can be no quarrel; however, if it is the duty
of the federal court to utter the local law (of the District of Columbia
in this case), then a real question presents itself: Has the federal court
accomplished its mission?65 Or is this a matter which should have been
left to the Congress which legislates for the District? In support of its
conclusion (which must have mystified or at least astonished the courts
of the District), the appellate court cites three bases:
First, we believe that the old rule was based on certain factual
assumptions which are no longer true; on its own terms, it can no
longer be justified. Second, we believe that the consumer protection
cases discussed above require that the old rule be abandoned in order
to bring residential landlord-tenant law into harmony with the principles
on which those cases rest. Third, we think that the nature of today's
urban housing market also dictates abandonment of the old rule.659
The court noted that there was considerable dissatisfaction with
the common-law property rule. In an early case,"6 ° New York made an
exception by holding that an upper story tenant was not obliged to pay
657 "However, the Supreme Courts of at least two states, in recent and well-reasoned
opinions, have held landlords to implied warranties of quality in housing leases. Lemle v.
Breeden, S. Ct. Hawaii, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
251 A.2d 268 (1969). See also Pines v.Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961)."
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
658 If the local law of the District of Columbia is to be enunciated by the courts of
the District, much as the state courts are expected to declare the pertinent law as directed
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), then it is hard to understand the appellate decision unless Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) may be considered a precedent.
Certainly the courts of the District must have been almost as much at sea to account for
the reversal in the Williams case as in Javins.
659 The common law rule absolving the lessor of all obligation to repair in the early
Middle Ages and was considered "settled" by 1485, 3 Holdsworth, A History of English
Law, 122-3 (6th ed. 1934). Such a rule was well suited to an agrarian economy; the land
was more important than whatever small structures were included in the leasehold, and the
tenant farmer was fully capable of making repairs himself. These historical facts were the
basis on which the common law formulated its rule; they also provided the necessary pre-
requisites for its application.
660 Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 (1863).
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rent after his apartment was destroyed." 1 Another exception was created
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts described by Mr. Jus-
tice Wright as "a court not known for its willingness to depart from the
common law" 62 in the following language:
* * * [A] different rule should apply to one who hires a furnished room,
or a furnished house, for a few days, or a few weeks or months. Its fit-
ness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appoint-
ments, is a far more important element entering into the contract than
when there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a
house provided with all furnishings and appointments for immediate
residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well-understood
purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. * * * It would be unrea-
sonable to hold, under such circumstances, that the landlord does not
impliedly agree that what he is letting is a house suitable for occupation
in its condition at the time. * * *663
The court then concludes that its approach ought to be assisted "by
principles derived from the consumer protection cases ...the tenant
must rely upon the skill and bona ftides of his landlord at least as much
as a car buyer must rely upon the car manufacturer."6'"
To bolster its argument, the court cited and quoted Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.66 where Mr. Justice John J. Francis rendered
the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a classic
precedent a decade ago followed in a steadly increasing number of
jurisdictions. 6 There, the court sounded the deathknell of privity of
warranty in product liability cases thereby evoking much academic
comment, mostly favorable.667
661 This in spite of the early case of Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897
(K.B. 1647).
662 Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
663 Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
664 Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra note 662.
665 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
666 Many of these are listed in Part I of this article at note 4, p. 124.
667 Among the articles that may be mentioned are the following cited in 8 Williston,
Contracts § 995A (3d ed. Jaeger 1964) :
"Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc. supra is noted in: 26 Albany LR 349; 12
Baylor LR 345; 2 Boston College Ind & Corn LR 133; 48 Calif. LR 873; 46 Cornell
LQ 607; 65 Dick LR 64; 29 Fordham LR 183; 74 Harv. LR 630; 59 Mich. LR 467;
7 New York LF 59; 39 NC LR 299; 36 Notre Dame Law 233; 40 Ore LR 364; 14
Rutgers LR 829; 16 Rutgers LR 559; 35 St. John's LR 178; 36 St. John's LR 123;
39 Tex LR 694; 8 UCLA LR 658; 29 U Cin LR 519; 8 UCLA LR 658; 38 U Det
Q 218; 109 U Pa LR 453; 14 Vand LR 681; 18 Wash & Lee LR 124; 7 Wayne
LR 382; 12 Western Res LR 387."
The Henningsen case supra is discussed and approved in Jaeger, Products Liability,
NEWSLETTER, General Practice Section, ABA, VoL 1, No. 4, p. 6, where other leading
cases are analyzed.
See also Lambert, Justice Francis and Products Liability Law, in Justice John J.
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After a review of some of the earlier cases such as Edwards v.
Habib,"'8 Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 69 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Man-
agement Co.,67 and Kanelos v. Kettler,6 ' the court commented as to
the Brown case that there "the premises were let in violation of Sections
2304 and 2501 of the [Housing] Regulations and that the lease, there-
fore, was void as an illegal contract."67 This expression is certainly a
contradiction in terms, since by definition, a contract is an enforceable
agreement."'
Thereafter, the court concentrated on a decision of the Illinois Su-
preme Court, Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co.674 Careful examination of
this case does not quite indicate how it is in point, except that it does
involve violations of the Chicago building code. 75 Nevertheless, the
Schiro opinion is quoted to the effect that the law existing at the time
and place of the "making of the contract" is deemed to be a part of the
agreement.67 Properly qualified, this is nothing new and has long been
a canon of interpretation or construction.677
Francis Symposium, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 426 (1970) ; Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability
and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493 (1962).
B68 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
669 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
670 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
671 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
672 Emphasis supplied.
673 See 1 Williston, Contracts, §§ 1 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1957).
674 18 fll. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) ; the case is discussed in 4 Williston, Con-
tracts, § 615, pp. 619-621 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
875 Chicago Building Code.
The Schiro case was concerned with granting a decree of specific performance to the
vendee of a building in Chicago. There were various violations of the city code including
a failure to install a separate drainage and plumbing system, no independent connection
with a private or public sewer, and no direct connection of the water mains with the city
water supply system. In granting the equitable remedy, the court noted:
These violations of the city code were tantamount to a breach of contract.
This contract was further breached by the fact that defendants could not give
a deed free and clear of all encumbrances, in accordance with their agreement,
since, as a result of defendants' improper construction of the building plaintiff was
required to share the sewerage and water systems with the owners of the adjoining
property.
Notwithstanding these contract breaches, it is well established that a court of
equity will, at the option of the purchaser, order specific performance of a contract
to convey property so far as the vendor is able to perform, with an abatement out of
the purchase money for any deficiency in title, quality or quantity of the estate.
Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 ll.2d 538 (1960), at 546, 165 N.E.2d 286.
876 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867) is probably the leading
case so holding; cf. Unsinn v. Wilson, 285 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; leading Illinois deci-
sions include People v. Ortman, 353 Ill. 427, 187 N.E. 470 (1933) ; American Nat. Bank v.
General Out. Adv. Co., 11 Ill. App. 2d 602, 153 N.E.2d 110 (1958).
677 Williston criticizes the broad language used in Von Hoffman v. Quincy, supra pre-
ceding note, to the effect that "the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making
of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into it and form a part of it, as if they
were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms."
This is substantially the purport of the Schiro opinion quoted by Judge Wright, "the
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We follow the Illinois court in holding that the housing code must
be read into housing contracts-a holding also required by the purposes
and the structure of the code itself. The duties imposed by the Housing
Regulations may not be waived or shifted by agreement if the Regula-
tions specifically place the duty upon the lessor .... 678
After discussing a leading Wisconsin precedent, Pines v. Pers-
sion s'7 dealing with the impact of a housing code on the common law
rule, the court concluded: "We therefore hold that the Housing Regula-
tions imply a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards which
they set out, into leases of all housing that they cover.) 680
In Javins v. First National Corporation,68 ' the landlord sought pos-
session of the leasehold for nonpayment of rent. Contrary to common
law principles, the court declared that in extending "all contract reme-
dies for breach to the parties to a lease, we include an action for specific
performance of the landlord's implied warranty of habitability."6 2
law existing at the time and place of the making of the contract is deemed a part of the
contract, as though expressly referred to or incorporated in it."
As Williston puts it, the method of statement used by the Supreme Court (as well as
by the Illinois Supreme Court and Judge Wright) "is obviously artificial; and it seems un-
fortunate, as a matter of terminology, to put in the form of a fiction matters which may be
stated accurately. To assume, first, that everybody knows the law, and, second, that every-
body thereupon makes his contract with reference to it and adopts its provisions as terms
of the agreement, is indeed to pile a fiction upon a fiction . . ." (Emphasis supplied);
Williston, Contracts, § 615, pp. 602, 605. The italicized language and Williston's criticism
are adopted in a well reasoned opinion, Grace Line, Inc. v. United States, 255 F.2d 810
(2d Cir. 1958) af'g 144 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1956): "This labyrinthine argument is an
attempt 'to pile a fiction upon a fiction.'" To the same effect, see Deerhurst Estates v.
Meadow Homes, Inc. supra preceding note, discussed in Williston, Contracts, § 602,
Interpretation and Construction Distinguished, pp. 320-323.
678 In footnotes, the court observes:
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress' explicit direc-
tion for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive congressional concern to
secure for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to
live. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, at 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Any private agreement to shift the duties would be illegal and unenforceable.
The precedents dealing with industrial safety statutes are directly in point:
* * * * [Tihe only question remaining is whether the courts will enforce
or recognize as against a servant an agreement express or implied on his part
to waive the performance of a statutory duty of the master imposed for the pro-
tection of the servant, and in the interest of the public, and enforceable by
criminal prosecution. We do not think they will. To do so would be to nullify
the object of the statute * * * *
Narramore v. N. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899).
See W. Prosser, Torts § 67 at 468-469 (3d ed. 1964) and cases cited therein.
879 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-413 (1961).
680 Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); emphasis
supplied.
681 Id.
682 This statement appears in footnote 61, Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra
note 680. Does this mean that the tenant may file suit to compel the landlord to make re-
pairs necessary to make the premises habitable? So it would appear. However, there might
be some difference of opinion as what repairs are essential, and which ones are merely
desirable. Of course, the courts will resolve these differences after the usual course of
litigation.
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According to principles of contract law, the obligation to pay rent
for the premises "is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his
obligations, including his warranty to maintain the premises in habit-
able condition.s
At trial, the finder of fact must make two findings: (1) whether
the alleged violations existed during the period for which past due rent
is claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's breach. If no part of
the tenant's rental obligation is found to have been suspended, then ajudgment for possession may issue forthwith. On the other hand, if thejury determines that the entire rental obligation has been extinguished
by the landlord's total breach, then the action for possession on the
ground of nonpayment must fail.684
Landlords may derive some consolation from the foregoing ex-
cerpt. If the lessor has done his part, and furnished an inhabitable tene-
ment, the lessee must pay the rent or face eviction.6"5 To afford greater
consumer protection is certainly a desirable result. But should it have
been done by overruling half a millenium of precedent?
In the meantime, the same court, speaking through the same judge
in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Company,"6 has held that when a tenant re-
fuses to pay rent because of the landlord's violations of the housing
code the court may require the rent to be paid into the registry of the
court.6 8 7
However, the court indicated that this power of equity is to be
683 "Habitable condition" may mean pursuant to the pertinent requirements of the
building code; the court added:
In order to determine whether any rent is owed to the landlord, the tenants must
be given an opportunity to prove the housing code violations alleged as breach of
the landlord's warranty.
To be relevant, of course, the violations must affect the tenant's apartment or
common areas which the tenant uses. Moreover, the contract principle that one may
benefit from his own wrong will allow the landlord to defend by proving the damage
was caused by the tenant's wrongful action. However, violations resulting from in-
adequate repairs or materials which disintegrate under normal use would not be as-
signable to the tenant.
684 Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; in a footnote,
the court indicated the limits of its holding:
As soon as the landlord made the necessary repairs rent would again become due.
Our holding, of course, affects only eviction for nonpayment of rent. The landlord
is free to seek eviction at the termination of the lease or on any other legal ground.
685 The jury may find that part of the tenant's rental obligation has been suspended
but that part of the unpaid back rent is indeed owed to the landlord. In these circum-
stances, no judgment for possession should issue if the tenant agrees to pay the partial
rent found to be due. If the tenant refuses to pay the partial amount, a judgment for
possession may then be entered, id. at 1083.
686 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
687 Id. at 482.
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sparingly exercised, and should be ordered only when the tenant has
requested a jury trial or asserted a defense involving violations of the
building code by the landlord, and following a motion of the landlord
and opportunity for oral argument by both parties. The court cited
and relied on Javins v. First National Realty Corporation.. discussed
above, and declared:
Certainly such a protective order represents a noticeable break with
the ordinary processes of civil litigation, in which, as a general rule, the
plaintiff has no advance assurance of the solvency of the defendant.
Moreover, imposing on litigants who are eligible to proceed informa pauperis the requirement that a defense may be maintained only
upon payment of a given sum of money-whether this sum is char-
acterized as a rental prepayment or an appeal bond--seems incongruous.
Recent decisions of this court, which have enhanced the opportunities
for indigents to participate meaningfully in the judicial process, high-
light this incongruity. 89
After a further discussion of the rights of indigents, especially as
to being furnished "a free transcript," the court concluded that it is de-
sirable to enlarge proceedings in forma pauperis, lest tenants be dis-
couraged from asserting valid defenses when landlords seek eviction or
the payment of back rent.69 °
However, the court concedes that there are situations where it be-
comes essential to protect the rights of landlords.69 1 In this connection,
it is pointed out that-
The action for possession has traditionally been characterized as
a summary proceeding, the landlord foregoing the past due rent in
order to recover possession and effect a substitution of tenants. Recent
practice has, however, altered the summary nature of such actions: a
tenant may, upon timely request and a statement of facts underlying
his defense, proceed to a jury trial with the inevitable delay in the ulti-
mate disposition of the case; a tenant may interpose the defense that no
rent was owed either because the landlord breached his contractual
obligations to the tenant, or because the lease was illegal and void ab
initio. The tenant, of course, remains in possession during the pendency
of a suit for possession.
In short, the landlord has lost the advantage of the summary
proceeding and is instead exposed to a prolonged period of litigation
688 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), supra notes 636 et seq.
689 Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); emphasis supplied,
citing Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
690 The cost of the litigation might be out of all proportion to the amount, if any,
recoverable.
691 This concession should prove somewhat reassuring to the landlords who might
otherwise be forced to conclude that private property rights no longer have any real sig-
nificance.
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without rental income. And, realistically, the likelihood of this occurring
cannot be ignored when the tenant has been allowed to proceed in
jorma pauperis.
Thus, in recognition of the emerging non-summary nature of the
suit for possession, the concomitant severe disadvantage in which the
landlord has been placed during such litigation, and the potential for
dilatory tactics which judicial innovation in this area has bred, we
conclude that the prepayment of rent requirement as a method of pro-
tecting the landlord may be employed in limited fashion. Indeed, we
have already endorsed prepayment of rent pending disposition of land-
lord-tenant litigation involving the breach of warranty defense.6 92
But the court declined to lay down a rule:
However, not all litigation in which the tenant requests a jury or
asserts a defense based on violation of the Housing Regulations will be
equally appropriate for imposition of the protective order, and it is not
our intent to promulgate so inflexible a rule. Indeed, we promulgate no
rule at all, believing that the preferable course is to leave the decision
on a case-by-case basis to the discretion of the trial judge.6 93
As to the application of the cost of repairs to the rent by the tenant,
the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a recent case 94 was
quoted with approval:
"If, therefore, a landlord fails to make the repairs and replacements
of vital facilities necessary to maintain the premises in a livable condi-
tion for a period of time adequate to accomplish such repair and replace-
ments, the tenant may cause the same to be done and deduct the cost
thereof from future rents. * * * This does not mean that the tenant is
relieved from the payment of rent so long as the landlord fails to re-
pair. The tenant has only alternative remedies of making the repairs or
removing from the premises upon such a constructive eviction."6 95
Action was brought by the landlord to dispossess the tenant who
had a one-year lease contract for an apartment in Camden, New Jersey.
There was no specific covenant for repairs by the lessor. Defendant
tenant discovered that the toilet in the bathroom was cracked and that
692 Quoting Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, at (D.C. Cir. 1970):
Appellants in the present cases offered to pay rent into the registry of the court
during the present action. We think this is an excellent protective procedure. If the
tenant defends against an action for possession on the basis of breach of the land-
lord's warranty of habitability, the trial court may require the tenant to make future
rent payments into the registry of the court as they become due; such a procedure
would be appropriate only while the tenant remains in possession. The escrowed
money will, however, represent rent for the period between the time the landlord
files suit and the time the case comes to trial. In the normal course of litigation,
the only factual question at trial would be the condition of the apartment during the
time the landlord alleged rent was due and not paid.
693 Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
694 Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
695 Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535. (Emphasis supplied.)
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water was leaking all over the floor. After repeated efforts to notify the
landlord were unsuccessful, she called a plumber who repaired the
damaged fixture and was paid therefor by the tenant.
When the next instalment of rent was due, the tenant mailed the
landlord a check from which was deducted the cost of the repairs. The
latter then demanded full payment of the rent; when this was refused,
summary dispossession of the tenant was demanded. 96 The trial court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.697 The
appellate court held that "equitable defenses as well as legal defenses"
are available to the tenant in this type of action. The lack of an express
covenant to repair was emphasized; the question then arose, Was there
an implied covenant which would require the landlord to make re-
pairs?'69
A lease was originally considered a conveyance of an interest in
real estate. Thus, the duties and obligations of the parties, implied as
well as express, were dealt with according to the law of property and
not of the law of contracts. 699
Historically a lease was viewed as a sale of an interest in land. The
concept of caveat emptor, applicable to such sales, seemed logically
pertinent to leases of land. There was neither an implied covenant of
fitness for the intended use nor responsibility in the landlord to main-
tain the leased premises. 700 This principle, suitable for the agrarian
setting in which it was conceived, lagged behind changes in dwelling
habits and economic realities.701 Exceptions to the broad immunity in-
evitably developed.702
The court then concentrated its attention on modern developments
in the law of real property, and the emerging tendency of the courts to
apply principles of contract law to leases:702
The guidelines employed to construe contracts have been mod-
ernly applied to the construction of leases. 3 Thompson on Real Prop-
696 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53(b).
697 The trial judge conceived the issue as entirely a legal one and determined that the
facts which defendant alleged did not create a duty upon the landlord to make repairs.
Thus, without trying out the issues tendered by defendant, he found a default in payment
of rent of $85.72 (July) and $95 (August) plus costs and rendered a judgment for pos-
session.
698 7 Williston, Contracts § 946 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
699 This approach is gradually yielding to the modern concept of regarding the lease
as a contract and interpreting it as such, 4 Williston, Contracts, §§ 600 et seq. (3d ed.
Jaeger 1961).
700 Citing Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 130 A.2d 833 (1957);
Bolitho v. Mintz, 106 NJ.L. 449, 148 A. 737 (E. & A. 1930).
701 Citing 1 American Law of Property (1952), § 3.78, p. 347.
702 Quoting Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 NJ. 379, at 382, 140 A.2d 199, at 201
(1958).
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erty 377 (1959). See also 6 Williston on Contracts, 3d ed. Jaeger,
§ 890A, p. 592 (1962):
"There is a clearly discernible tendency on the part of the
courts to cast aside technicalities in the interpretation of leases and
to concentrate their attention, as in the case of other contracts, on
the intention of the parties, * * * -0o
After quoting extensively from Pines v. Perssion,7 4 also relied on
by Judge Wright in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, 5 and
Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper,0 6 the court suggests that:
A covenant in a lease can arise only by necessary implication
from specific language of the lease or because it is indispensable to
carry into effect the purpose of the lease. In determining, under con-
tract law, what covenants are implied, the object which the parties had
in view and intended to be accomplished, is of primary importance.
The subject matter and circumstances of the letting give at least as
clear a clue to the natural intentions of the parties as do the written
words. It is of course not the province of the court to make a new con-
tract or to supply any material stipulations or conditions which contra-
vene the agreements of the parties.70 7
Discussing the all important question of when covenants or other
provisions are to be implied in a contract, the court quotes the opinion
in a leading case, William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co.,70 s stat-
ing:
Terms are to be implied not because "they are just or reasonable,
but rather for the reason that the parties must have intended them and
have only failed to express them * * * or because they are necessary to
give business efficacy to the contract as written, or to give the contract
the effect which the parties, as fair and reasonable men, presumably
would have agreed on if, having in mind the possibility of the situa-
tion which has arisen, they contracted expressly in reference thereto. ' '70 9
In Marini v. Ireland,71 here under consideration, the lease re-
stricted the use of the premises to "dwelling." The natural inference
703 6 Williston, Contracts, § 890A (3d ed. Jaeger 1962).
704 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
705 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
706 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
707 Citing Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 161 A.2d 717 (1960) ; Wash-
ington Construction Co., Inc. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617 (1951) ; City of Camden
v. South Jersey Port Commission, 4 NJ. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950); McBride v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 128 N.J.L. 64, 23 A.2d 596 (E. & A. 1942).
708 26 N.J. Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (1954). See also Silverstein v. Keane, 19 N.J. 1,
115 A.2d 1 (1955) ; Cragmere Holding Corp. v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co., 65 N.J. Super. 322,
167 A.2d 825 (App. Div. 1961) ; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 239; 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Con-
ditions and Restrictions, § 14.
709 Id. at 487, 98 A.2d at 129.
710 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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reasonable people would be led to was the apartment was habitable and
tenantable:
The very object of the letting was to furnish the defendant with quar-
ters suitable for living purposes. This is what the landlord at least im-
pliedly (if not expressly) represented he had available and what the
tenant was seeking. In a modern setting, the landlord should, in resi-
dential letting, be held to an implied covenant against latent defects,
which is another manner of saying, habitability and livability fitness.
711
And further it is a covenant that these facilities will remain in usable
condition during the entire term of the lease. In performance of this
covenant the landlord is required to maintain those facilities in a con-
dition which renders the property livable.
It is eminently fair and just to charge a landlord with the duty of
warranting that a building or part thereof rented for residential pur-
poses is fit for that purpose at the inception of the term and will re-
main so during the entire term.
•.. Where damage has been caused maliciously or by abnormal or un-
usual use, the tenant is conversely liable for repair. The nature of vital
facilities and the extent and type of maintenance and repair required
is limited and governed by the type of property rented and the amount
of rent reserved. Failure to so maintain the property would constitute
a constructive eviction. 71 2
It should be remembered that historically, the landlord's covenant
to alter or repair premises and the tenant's covenant to pay rent were
generally regarded as independent covenants. The landlord's failure to
perform did not entitle the tenant to make the repair and offset the cost
thereof against future rent. It only gave rise to a separate cause of ac-
tion for breach of covenant.7 13
This result is also brought about by the application to leases of
real property law rather than the principles of contracts. Originally, the
concept of mutually dependent promises was not applied to the ascer-
tainment of whether covenants in leases were dependent or independent.
However, an increasing number of jurisdictions recognize that cove-
711 Citing Hyland v. Parkside Investment Co., Inc., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (Sup.
Ct. 1932). The court added:
It is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant one "to re-
pair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." Actually it is a covenant that at the
inception of the lease, there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the
premises for residential purposes because of faulty original construction or deteriora-
tion from age or normal usage.
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
712 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
713 Duncan Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware, Inc., 34 N.J. Super. 293, at 298,
112 A.2d 274, at 277 (App. Div. 1955), cert. denied 19 N.J. 328, 116 A.2d 829 (1955);
Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L 648, 92 A. 392 (E. & A. 1914).
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nants are dependent or independent according to the intention of the
parties and the good sense of the case.714 And the court continued, re-
versing the trial court:
It is of little comfort to a tenant in these days of housing shortage
to accord him the right, upon a constructive eviction, to vacate the
premises and end his obligation to pay rent. Rather he should be ac-
corded the alternative remedy of terminating the cause of the construc-
tive eviction where as here the cause is the failure to make reasonable
repairs. 715 This latter course of action is accompanied by the right to
offset the cost of such repairs as are reasonable in the light of the value
of the leasehold against the rent. His pursuit of the latter form of relief
should of course be circumscribed by the aforementioned conditions.
Finally, a word of encouragement or consolation was vouchsafed the
landlord:
We realize that the foregoing may increase the trials and appeals
in landlord and tenant dispossess cases and thus increase the burden of
the judiciary. By way of warning, however, it should be noted that the
foregoing does not constitute an invitation to obstruct the recovery of
possession by a landlord legitimately entitled thereto. It is therefore
suggested that if the trial of the matter is delayed the defendant may be
required to deposit the full amount of unpaid rent in order to protect
the landlord if he prevails.7 16
As this article goes to press, the supreme court of Illinois has just
handed down two decisions which are diametrically opposed to the judg-
ment rendered in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation.717 In
714 Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 280, 131 A. 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; the court
held that "covenants are to be construed as dependent or independent according to the
intention and meaning of the parties and the good sense of the case. Technical words should
give way to such intention. 7 R. C. L. 1090, § 7. So, the rule is thus stated; where the acts
or covenants of the parties are concurrent, and to be done or performed at the same time,
the covenants are dependent, and neither party can maintain an action against the other,
without averring and proving performance on his part.
"In the present-case, the covenant to pay rent and the covenant to heat the apartment
are mutual and dependent. In the modem apartment house equipped for heating from a
central plant, entirely under the control of the landlord or his agent, heat is one of the
things for which the tenant pays under the name 'rent.'"
The courts have on a case-by-case basis held various lease covenants and covenants to
pay rent as dependent and under the guise of a constructive eviction have considered breach
of the former as giving the right to the tenant to remove from the premises and terminate his
obligation to pay rent. McCurdy v. Wyckoff, 73 NJ.L. 368, 63 A. 992 (Sup. Ct. 1906);
Weiler v. Pancoast, 71 N.J.L. 414, 58 A. 1084 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Higgins v. Whiting, 102
N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Stevenson Stanoyevich Fund v. Steinacher, 125
N.J.L. 326, 15 A.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
715 Citing Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 462, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
The Reste case supra is discussed in Laird, Reste Realty Corporation-The Landlord
Meets His Tenant, in the Justice John J. Francis Symposium, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 508 (1970).
718 Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) ; the judgment of reversal was
unanimous.
717 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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these cases,71 s the high court rejected the contention that the tenants
against whom the actions were brought could properly refuse to pay
rent where it was alleged that the landlord had failed to make necessary
repairs. Thus, there was a specific refusal to overrule the 500-year old
real property principle that covenants to pay rent and to repair are in-
dependent, and not concurrent conditions. 19 This leaves to the legisla-
ture a determination of whether any change in the existing law govern-
ing housing is necessary or desirable. In the meantime, a rehearing has
been granted by the court.
In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,72 (consolidated with Sutton & Peter-
son, Inc. v. Price721 "because of the similarity of the facts and the issues
involved"), lessee-defendants refused to pay rent because of the land-
lords' failure to make necessary repairs. The latter brought these
actions under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act722 to evict the de-
fendants. The trial court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff-
lessors; the defendants appealed.72
After reviewing the facts, which indicated that certain repairs were
promised by the landlord but were not made, and furthermore, that
there were numerous violations of the housing code of Chicago which
made "the premises unfit and unsafe for habitation," the court sum-
marized the basic contentions of the defendants:"2
The principal thrust of the defendants' argument on this appeal
is that a lease is a series of "expressed and implied bilateral covenants"
between the landlord and the tenant, and that the latter's promise to
pay monthly rent is not to be considered independent of the landlord's
oral promises and obligations to repair defects and maintain the leased
premises consistently with the requirements of the city building code.
Defendants contend that they are not actually refusing to pay rent but
718 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, No. 41730 (1970), - 1l1. -, - N.E. -; Alexander
v. Hamilton Corp. No. 42882 (1970), - Ill. -, - N.E. -. (Rehearing allowed Jan. 27,
1971; now under advisement for September Term, 1971).
719 Means v. Dierks, 180 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Hosang v. Minor, 205 Cal. App. 2d
269, 22 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1962); Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co.,
144 N.Y. 34, 39 N.E. 7 (1894) ; cf. Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass.
124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959).
720 No. 41730 (1970), - ll. -, - N.E. -.
721 No. 41739 (1970). - Mll. -, - N.E. -.
722 I1. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 57.
723 The trial court granted a motion to strike the answer in each case based on its
construction of the Forcible Entry & Detainer Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 57, para 5, which
is quoted.
724 These contentions were remarkably similar to those advanced by defendant and
accepted by the court, in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
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are simply "withholding" their monthly rental payments until the land-
lords fulfilll their promises to repair the alleged defects. To allow the
landlords to summarily evict them for nonpayment of rent under the
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, argue defendants, would be out of
keeping with modern standards of contract law, equal protection and
due process of law, and public policy.725
In answer to this, the plaintiffs simply pointed out that "the de-
cided cases in Illinois clearly hold" 728 that the lessee's obligation to pay
rent at stated intervals and the promise by the landlord to make repairs
are, and have been traditionally for some five centuries, independent
covenants. 727 At common law, breach by a landlord of his express cove-
nant to repair the premises could not be construed as a defense to a de-
faulting tenant where the suit was for possession of the leasehold.728
Quoting a leading Illinois decision 721 wherein the landlord was
suing for possession, the court declared:
The covenant to pay rent was not upon condition that plaintiff com-
fortably heat said premises, but was a separate and independent cove-
nant; and when he failed to perform it, the landlord had the right,
after notice and demand, to declare the lease forfeited, and to sue for
possession. "The whole question in actions of this nature is, does the
defendant unlawfully withhold possession of the premises sought to be
recovered in the action. 73 0
While expressing its sympathy for the "low-income" tenants who
are victimized by rapacious and unscrupulous landlords, the high court
nevertheless felt that the change in the law advocated by the defendants
would be legally unsound and might do more harm than good in the
725 In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718; emphasis supplied. But the court
pointed out that the defendants had not cited any Illinois decisions, nor were any found
in support of their theory that promises to pay rent and to make repairs are bilateral and
mutually dependent covenants; indeed, the defendants' briefs candidly acknowledge that they
are seeking a change in the established law of leasehold conveyances (see Gibbons v. Hoe-
feld, 299 Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1920)), which they characterize as "medieval." Defendants
contend that present-day housing conditions and the limited availability of housing to low.
income groups in urban areas compellingly favor adoption of a new rule allowing tenants
to avoid or "withhold" payments of rent until previously promised repairs of the leased
premises have been made. Such a rule, the defendants argue, would afford a remedy where
none is now available against those landlords who make a practice of leasing run-down
or defective dwellings to low income persons upon false promises of making repairs in the
future.
726 Citing Truman v. Rodesch, 168 Ill. App. 304 (1912); Geiger v. Brown, 167 Ill.
App. 534 (1912).
727 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 122-123 (6th ed. 1934).
728 6 Williston, Contracts § 820 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
729 Truman v. Rodesch, supra note 726 at 306.
730 Quoting Woodbury v. Ryel, 128 11. App. 459 (1906).
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attempted improvement of housing conditions for tenants in the lower
income brackets. As stated by the majority:...
We cannot agree with defendants in their assumption that lessees now
have no remedy under the law against landlords who promise repairs
in order to induce entry into a lease and later renege on the promise.
It is well established under past decisions that a tenant aggrieved by
his lessor's breach of an express covenant or a statutory obligation to
make repairs, furnish heat or provide services, may treat the lease as
terminated and vacate the premises, with no further obligation to pay
rent. This rule, known as the doctrine of constructive eviction, requires
that there be an actual abandonment of the leased premises within a
reasonable time; the tenant may not remain in possession indefinitely
and refuse or withhold payment of rent.73 2
After reviewing a number of significant Illinois precedents, the
court quoted Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corporation:73 3
There can be no constructive eviction, however, without the vacat-
ing of the premises. Where a tenant fails to surrender possession after
the landlord's commission of acts justifying the abandonment of the
premises the liability for rent will continue so long as possession of the
premises is continued.734
From the standpoint of fostering availability of leasehold dwell-
ings in urban areas, we believe that the existing doctrine of construc-
tive eviction has far more to recommend it than the new rule urged by
defendants herein. If tenants were permitted to remain in possession
while paying no rent until such time as the lessor fulfills alleged prom-
ises to repair defects, we feel that many landlords would be reluctant,
if not wholly unwilling, to engage in the business of renting residential
dwelling places, particularly in congested or low income urban areas.
Moreover, if the refusal-of-rent rule proposed by the defendants for
residential dwellings were to be adopted, we perceive no legal or ra-
tional basis for excluding from it other classes of leased premises, such
as stores, offices, warehouses and other properties. The constructive
eviction doctrine applies equally and uniformly to all kinds of lease-
hold properties, whether residential or business, and we think it affords
a reasonable remedy to the tenant without discouraging lessors from
engaging in business. 735
The court then pointed out that none of the cases cited by the de-
fendant was "in point." '736 This is especially noteworthy since these
731 Three judges dissented.
732 Citing Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 111. 196, 172 N.E. 35
(1930); Giddings v. Williams, 336 Ill. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929); Gibbons v. Hoefeld, 299
Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921) ; see also I American Law of Property, § 3.51.
733 340 fI1. 196, at 201-202 172 N.E. 35 at (1930).
734 Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 M. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930).
735 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718.
736 Referring to Gula v. Gawel, 71 flL App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966) ; Reitmeyer
v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968).
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cases include Pines v. Perssion," 't upon which great reliance was placed
by Mr. Justice Wright in javins v. First National Realty Corporation,8
although it was not "a possessory action."
739
There, the tenants entered into a lease of a house on the representa-
tion of the landlord that the premises would be made habitable, cleaned
and repaired prior to their taking possession. When this was not done,
the tenants moved in, attempted to make the repairs and then vacated
the premises. They sued to recover their security deposit, plus the
cost of labor performed in attempting to make the premises habitable.
While the high court of Wisconsin mentioned "an implied war-
ranty of habitability" in the course of its opinion, it was actually not
necessary to its decision, since the tenants vacated the premises and it
was held quite simply that under the circumstances, there was no
obligation to pay rent.740 In short, the result was the same as construc-
tive eviction. 7 1' Thus, the case is clearly inapposite.
Proceeding to an examination of the argument advanced by the
defendants that they had been deprived of their constitutional rights to
a considerable extent by the "disparate economic power of the land-
lord and individual tenant, induced by the lack of standard low and
moderate income housing in our urban centers" the court declares it
to be "nebulous at best.714 s Thereupon, it added significantly:
It is not as if there were a paucity of remedies for the tenant to
pursue. Not only does he have the benefit of constructive eviction re-
ferred to above but he also has the right to enforce the lessor's express
covenant to repair by a suit on the lease. Allowing rent withholding as
a means of forced compliance with the lessor's covenant to repair
would in effect create an unconscionable situation whereby tenants
could, by seeking to enforce frivolous claims, deprive the landlord of
means to properly maintain the premises. 743
These observations are in sharp contrast to the comments made in
lavins v. First National Realty Corporation by the federal tribunal. 44
737 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
738 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
739 Consequently, the case was not in point.
740 Cl. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 M11. 196, 172 N.E. 35
(1930).
741 When there is constructive eviction, the tenant must leave the premises otherwise
he remains liable for the payment of rent.
742 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718.
743 Compare this statement in text with Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
744 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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The basic difference appears to stem from the unwillingness of the
Supreme Court of Illinois to usurp the powers of the Springfield legis-
lature, in short, to engage in far-reaching legislation. This reluctance is
graphically illustrated by the following clear and logical quotation:
Any action on our part in creating an implied covenant of habit-
ability on the part of the landlord throughout the period of tenancy
and allowing lessee abstention of rent payments could very well cause
more problems than benefits. Assuming arguendo that we adopt the
rule that the covenant of habitability, express or implied, is mutual
with the covenant to pay rent, we are then faced with innumerable
problems far beyond the capability of this or any other court to deal
with. Not only is there a problem with determining the scope of any
such covenant (e.g. at the outset or continuing, the substantiality of the
breach necessary to prompt withholding), but also what procedures are
to be followed so as to make this rule effective and yet protect the
property and rights of the parties pending and during litigation. E.g.
Who decides when a violation exists? What happens to the rent money
that has been withheld? If the tenants are to be permitted to under-
take repairs, who supervises the reasonableness of their conduct? May
rents be withheld if violations are prompted by the conduct of the
tenants? 7 45
Should there be a requirement that the reasonable value of the
premises being occupied be tendered, certain questions present them-
selves:
1. Who is to determine what is reasonable?7 46
2. When is the amount to be paid? 747
3. To whom is the money to be paid?741
It is possible that the economic consequences to the landlord of
allowing tenants to withhold rent may be so grave as to drive the latter
out of business if deprived of the income necessary to maintain the
premises.
749
The claim also is made that the defendants were entitled to remain
in possession and withhold their rental payments because violations of
the Chicago Housing Code were alleged in their answers .... 750
745 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718, citing Enforcement of Municipal Hous-
ing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1965).
746 According to the Javins case, supra note 743, the amount to be paid is based on
the rent.
747 The rent may be paid at the commencement of the suit.
748 Into the registry of the court, supra.
749 This might well leave the low-cost tenant without any habitation.
750 At this point, the court added:
Both of the defendants' answers averred that defective conditions in their
apartments violated certain provisions of the Housing Code (Municipal Code of
Chicago, §§ 78-11 through 78-20), and that the said Code prohibits the letting
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Defendants seek support for this novel contention from the general
principle in the law of contracts that contractual provisions in viola-
tion of existing law invalidate and nullify the contract .... 7" The
courts in applying this general principle have held that leases are com-
parable or equivalent to contracts. Leases held void and unenforceable
under this principle have typically involved instances where the leased
premises were used for purposes of prostitution or gambling with the
knowledge of the lessor.752 No case in this jurisdiction has ever held, to
our knowledge, that a lessee who claims the lease void or unenforceable
because of an alleged violation of law can both remain in possession of
the premises and withhold payment of rent from the lessor. Indeed, it
would seem most anomalous for a lessee being sued for eviction to set
up as a defense the invalidity and voidness of the lease on the basis of
illegality for any reason, and claim the right to stay in possession un-
der the illegal lease and withhold rent because entry into the lease was
prohibited by law. If the lessee can prove the allegation that defects in
the leased premises were in violation of the Housing Code, it does not
follow, and has never been held in this State, that the claimed illegality
gives the lessee the right to remain in possession and withhold rent
until the prohibited defects are corrected.753
As the courts have repeatedly pointed out, so long as the lessee
elects to remain in possession of the premises, even though the lessee
may ultimately establish a right to rescind the lease,754 vacate the
lease-hold or obtain other relief, the obligation to pay rent continues.
The rule is the same where the lessee claims constructive eviction but
continues to occupy the premises.755 And quoting McNally v. Moser,756
the court observed:
"One may not rely on illegality or invalidity where the doing of
that said to be forbidden may reasonably be made legal and possible
through administrative or judicial action." Here the alleged violations
of the Housing Code in the leased premises may be made legal or cor-
of dwellings or family units that are not in compliance with §§ 78-13.1 through
78-13.12 of the Code. Defendants' answers further alleged that the plaintiff-
lessors knew of the prohibited defects when the leases were executed or extended
and that the leases therefore were void and unenforceable.
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718.
751 Citing Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 ll.2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) (con-
tract for purchase of real estate) ; Illinois Bankers Life Assn. v. Collins, 341 Ill. 548, 173
N.E. 465 (1930) (life insurance policy).
752 Citing.Fields v. Brown, 188 Ill. 111, 58 N.E. 977 (1900); Harris v. McDonald, 194
Ill. 75, 62 N.E. 310 (1901).
753 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718; cf. with the statements appearing in
the Javins case, supra note 743.
754 See 13 Williston, Contracts (3d ed. Jaeger 1970), Chapter 46, especially § 1557.
When Is Rescission Available As a Remedy? Cf. Lipkin v. Burnstine, 18 Ill. App.2d 509,
152 N.E.2d 745 (1958); Goldblatt v. Sixty-Third & Halsted Realty Co., 338 Ill. App. 543,
88 N.E.2d 100 (1949).
755 See 7 Williston, Contracts, § 946 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963), for a discussion and cases
on constructive eviction. Cf. Keating v. Springer, 146 IlM. 481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893).
75e 210 Md. 127, 122 A.2d 555 (1956).
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rected through resort to available administrative or judicial proce-
dures. 757
After having concluded that it was not necessary to determine
whether violations of the Housing Code, as alleged by the defendants,
would relieve them of the payment of rent, the court observed:
The defendants have not vacated but insist upon the right to both
remain in possession and withhold rent. If such a right were to be rec-
ognized and adopted, tenants of leased dwellings in default of rent
payments could very easily avoid or postpone eviction for lengthy pe-
riods of time by alleging various defects under the Housing Code,
whether fancied or real. While abuse in this regard might well be safe-
guarded against by administrative machinery for inspection of dwell-
ing places and the payment of rents into an administrative or judicial
escrow fund, we believe that such a procedure is within the peculiar
province of the legislature to adopt and should not be judicially formu-
lated and imposed by edict or fiat of this court.758
After an extensive discussion of the state statutes that have been
adopted, especially the so-called "repair and deduct" laws78 9 which
allow the tenants to repair the premises and then deduct the costs from
the rent payment, the following observation appears:
We believe the legislative branch is in a manifestly better position
757 Id. at 138, 122 A.2d at 561; as to what constitutes constructive eviction, the court
commented:
The eviction which will discharge the liability of the tenant to pay rent is not
necessarily an actual physical expulsion from the premises or some part of them,
but any act of the landlord which renders the lease unavailing to the tenant or
deprives him of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises constitutes a constructive
eviction of the tenant, which exonerates him from the terms and conditions of the
lease and he may abandon it.
Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill. at 201-202, 172 N.E. at 37 (1930).
758 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718; emphasis supplied. Cf. O'Callaghan v.
Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 11.2d 436 at 441, 155 N.E.2d 545, at 547 (1958) ; see
also Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L Rev. 801, 842-849 (1965).
759 In California (Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1941, 1942), Montana (Mont. Rev. Code Ann.
secs. 42-20k, 202), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code see. 47.16-12, 13), Oklahoma (Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 41, sec. 31, 32) and South Dakota (S.D. Code secs. 38.0409-.0410) so-called
"repair and deduct" laws have been enacted which, under certain circumstances, allow the
tenants to repair the premises and deduct the costs thereof from the rent payments.
Another approach which has been taken is the "Rent Strike" law of New York. Article
7A of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law provides: "A special proceeding by
tenants of a multiple dwelling [defined as six or more apartments] in the City of New
York for a judgment directing the deposits of rents into court and their use for the purpose
of remedying conditions dangerous to life, health or safety may be maintained in the civil
courts of the City of New York."
Under the New York statutory scheme, it appears that at the very least some form of
administrative action must be sought and that self-help rent withholding is not permitted.
This is justifiably so, for where self-administered rent withholding is employed there is
absolutely no guarantee that it will be consistently or rationally applied. Such conduct de-
pends solely upon the tenant's own initiative and might impose a heavier burden totally out
of proportion to the remedy it seeks to accomplish, without any assurances to the landlord
that upon correction of the abuse the rent withheld will be available.
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than is this court to consider the numerous problems involved and that
any changes in well-settled common-law doctrine can and should be
made by appropriate legislation. 760
This undoubtedly represents the view of the great majority of
jurisdictions which are in the process of correcting judicial blunders,
such as committed in Winterbottom v. Wright,76' but are wholly disin-
clined to go to extremes of judicial legislation as in lavins v. First
National Realty Corporation.62 However, a rehearing has been granted
in Spring v. Little.
In both the lavins and the Jack Spring cases, the defendants
relied on Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co.763 A brief analysis of the case
will reveal how little it supports Javins v. First National Realty Cor-
poration.76 In the first place, it concerns a sale, not a lease. Further-
more, the remedy sought was specific performance of the written
contract. The only resemblance lies in the violation of building code
provisions in each case.765 A short summary of the facts may be help-
ful.
The plaintiff and defendant company entered into an agreement
for the purchase and sale of certain land upon which the vendor was
to build a certain structure, and vendee was to make certain payments
as specified. When the deed was tendered by the vendor company, the
plaintiff refused to accept it because of a failure to comply with
various provisions of the City Code of Chicago.766
The defendant company would not accede to the plaintiff's request
to make the necessary changes, or to allow an abatement of the pur-
chase price to cover these. Suit for specific performance was instituted
requesting that defendant company be required to make the necessary
alterations to conform to the City Code. The superior court of Cook
760 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra note 718.
761 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 LJ. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
762 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
763 18 l.2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960); the case is discussed in 4 Williston, Con-
tracts § 615, at 619-621 (3d. ed. Jaeger 1961).
764 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
765 Violations of the D.C. Building Code and of the City Code of Chicago were alleged.
766 Thus, defendant company did not construct a sewer solely for the use of plaintiff's
premises, as required by the City Code of Chicago, but had constructed a system whereby
the sewerage from plaintiff's property drained into the sewer on the adjoining lot 7; the
catch basin on plaintiff's property was used by the adjoining lot 7, contrary to the require-
ments of the code; and defendants did not connect the water pipes on plaintiff's premises
directly with the city water system, as required by the code, but rather connected them
through the system installed on the adjoining lot 7.
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County dismissed the suit since the contract did not provide for the
alterations being sought, nor would equity decree the making of "al-
terations or repairs." The plaintiff appealed.767 After reviewing the
situation and the contentions of the parties, the court observed:768
It is settled law that all contracts for the purchase and sale of
realty are presumed to have been executed in the light of existing law,
and with reference to the applicable legal principles .... Thus, the law
existing at the time and place of the making of the contract is deemed
a part of the contract, as though expressly referred to or incorporated
in it.769
The rationale for this rule is that the parties to the contract would
have expressed that which the law implies "had they not supposed that
it was unnecessary to speak of it because the law provided for it.'770
Consequently, the courts, in construing the existing law as part of the
express contract, are not reading into the contract provisions different
from those expressed and intended by the parties, as defendants con-
tend, but are merely construing the contract in accordance with the
intent of the parties.
Reviewing the holding in Economy Fuse & Manufacturing Co. v.
Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,771 the court concluded that the pertinent
provisions of the City Code were as much a part of the contract as if
they had been expressly incorporated therein. Failure to comply there-
with constituted breaches of contract. But, as the court pointed out:
Notwithstanding these contract breaches, it is well established that
a court of equity will, at the option of the purchaser, order specific
767 The plaintiff relied on the principle that specific performance of a contract for the
sale of real estate will be ordered, at the election of the purchaser, even though the vendor
may be unable to convey all of the property included in the contract, with an abatement of
the purchase price for slight defects in quantity and quality of the estate. Baker v. Puffer,
299 ill. 486, 499, 132 N.E. 429, 431 (1921) ; Gravelot v. Skender, 9 IMl. 2d 15, 20, 135 N.E.
2d 756, 758 (1956) ; Mitchell v. White, 295 M. 135, 128 N.E. 803 (1920).
See 11 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 43 Specific Performance and Other Equitable Remedies
(3d ed. Jaeger 1968).
768 It is therefore incumbent upon this court to examine and construe the contro-
verted contract. It is axiomatic that contracts must be construed to give effect to
the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and to this end the con-
tract should be construed as a whole, giving effect to every portion of the instru-
ment and preferring that construction which renders the agreement legal rather
than void.
Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill.2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960).
Cf. 4 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 22 Interpretation and Construction of Contracts (3d ed.
Jaeger 1961).
769 Citing I.L.P. Contracts § 229; Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile
Co., 111 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Collins, 341 MI1. 548, 173
N.E. 465 (1930) ; Hindu Incense Mfg. Co. v. MacKenzie, 403 Ill. 390, 86 N.E.2d 214 (1949);
Robertson v. Huntley and Blazier Co., 351 Ill. App. 378, 115 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
770 Quoting I.L.P. Contracts § 230.
771 111 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1940) applying Illinois law; the court held 'that it must
read into every written contract the law governing the parties at the time the contract was
made; criticized supra note 677.
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performance of a contract to convey property so far as the vendor is
able to perform, with an abatement out of the purchase money for any
deficiency in title, quality or quantity of the estate. 772
Finally, in a per curiam opinion, the supreme court of Illinois
had occasion to consider the issue of constitutionality of Sections 18
and 19 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act 773 insofar as it pro-
vides that "notice of appeal and bond must be filed within 5 days from
the rendition of the judgment (for possession)," Alexander v. Hamil-
ton Corporation.7
Among the arguments presented by defendants was that the bond
posting requirement had the effect of denying poor persons access to
"State courts of review. ' 775 Reviewing the case law, the court con-
cluded that there was no denial of due process or the equal protection
of the laws in requiring the kind of bond here under consideration.
A similar argument was advanced in an earlier case, Rosewood
Corporation v. Fisher,776 which had been taken under advisement. The
defendants had defaulted on their contracts for the purchase of certain
properties and had failed to post appeal bonds as required by law.
Thereupon, their appeals were dismissed. However, constitutional is-
sues having been raised, the supreme court reviewed the cases.777
Referring to the "equal protection" contention, the court was satis-
fied that a waiver of the required security bonds under Section 19 of
772 Citing Baker v. Puffer, 299 I. 486; Gravelot v. Skender, 9 Ill.2d 15, 20. In the
Baker case the court stated, at p. 492, that this rule, authorizing specific performance with
an abatement in the purchase price, applies in all cases where there is an encumbrance, or
a slight defect in the quantity or quality of the estate to be sold, and has been followed
by this court and those of other jurisdictions.
773 111 Rev. Stats. ch 57, § 19 (1967).
774 46 11m.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
775 The court's comment on this point is of more than passing interest:
In what must be viewed as a belated effort to create standing to raise the con-
stitutional point they seek to make, defendants have, however, filed so-called
"poverty affidavits" in this court. We say "so-called" because in our opinion the
affidavits, with few if any exceptions, fail to establish defendants as indigent per-
sons. Indeed, one of them claiming to be impoverished admits to a take-home pay
of $1,250 per month, savings of $3,000, and the ownership of two automobiles, in-
cluding a 1970 Cadillac.
776 46 I.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
777 The present appeals have been prosecuted from the orders dismissing the appeals
and, with one exception to be noted, such orders of dismissal are sufficient to give defen-
dants standing to present the constitutional issues they seek to raise. Cf. Air Line Stewards
and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Quinn, 35 III. 2d 106; Burket v. Reliance Bank and Trust Co.,
367 fI1. 196.
Alexander v. Hamilton Corp., supra note 774.
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the statute77 should not be ordered. Citing a similar case, Williams v.
Shaffer,779 it was pointed out that a statute requiring the posting of "a
bond with good security, payable to the landlord" in order to permit
the tenant to remain in possession and obtain a trial was held valid. The
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.7"0 The Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the statute under consideration was
constitutional.
78
'
LIABILITY INSURANCE MAY BE THE SOLUTION
It has been suggested by various authorities that an appropriate
method for spreading the loss resulting from defective products and
housing is by contracting for liability insurance." 2 This, however, is
subject to a caveat. In many of the policies there are so many excep-
tions, exclusions and exemptions that doubt often exists as to the ex-
tent of the coverage.7 8 In an economy which boasts of so many labor
saving devices, household and similar appliances, wherein defects are
mostly latent and rarely patent, some sort of protection for the user is
essential. And this is certainly true of new housing, where the buyer is
quite dependent upon the knowledge and skill of the builder-vendor.
778 This section reads:
"§ 19. If the defendant appeals, the condition of the bond shall be that he
will (a) prosecute such appeal with effect; and (b) regardless of the outcome of
such appeal, pay all rent then due or that may become due before the final deter-
mination of the suit; and (c) in case the judgment from which the appeal is taken
is affirmed or appeal dismissed, pay all damages and loss which the plaintiff may
sustain by reason of the withholding of the premises in controversy, and by reason
of any injury done thereto during such withholding, until the restitution of the
possession thereof to the plaintiff, together with all costs that may accrue; which
said bond shall be in sufficient amount to secure such rent, damages and costs, to
be ascertained and fixed by the court. And the court in which the appeal may be
pending may require a new bond in a larger amount, if necessary to secure the
rights of the parties; and in case of continuance, may require another bond to be
given to further secure the same." l. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 57, pars. 19, 20.
779 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
780 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
781 Alexander v. Hamilton Corp., supra note 774.
Cf. Sanks v. Georgia, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 593 (1971), where the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute requiring the tenant to post a bond in double the amount of the rent that
might be due at the end of the trial which would be forfeited to the landlord should the
tenant lose the case. Although the Supreme Court of Georgia had upheld the constitutionality
of the statute, the Supreme Court of the United States was not convinced, but concluded
that since the act had been repealed, there was no occasion for review.
782 7 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 31 Contracts of Insurance (3d ed. Jaeger 1963) and 11
Williston, op. cit. § 1399B; Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Du-
quesne U.L Rev. 1, 137 (1963).
783 See 7 Williston, op. cit. §§ 917-918.
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Any number of defects do not become apparent until some time after
the buyer has entered upon possession.7 4
The development of special insurance appears to parallel the
evolution of distinct airplane travel coverage; it was developed be-
cause of the frequency with which standard life policies excluded
death or injury resulting from the use of or travel in aircraft.7" 5 How-
ever, even where products liability risks are covered, this coverage is
often so limited because hedged about and ringed around with excep-
tions that its utility becomes doubtful.7" 6 An analysis and review of
some of the leading cases may prove helpful and instructive. 7
Thus, where the insured was denied coverage by the insurance
carrier, he sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer was re-
quired to defend him under a "Comprehensive General Liability
policy," ' 8 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.78 9
The facts indicated that when a customer sat in a cane chair which
was on display in the vendor's store in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, the
chair collapsed and the customer was injured. The insurance company
denied coverage and refused to defend the action unless defendant
company agreed to hold the insurer harmless.790 The court, however,
held that under the terms of the endorsement, the insurance company
was clearly obligated to defend the action and although the plaintiffs
were unsuccessful, the insured was nevertheless entitled to a recovery
for the expenses of litigation.791
784 These are examined in the cases discussed supra pp. 33-47.
785 As, for example, in Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 306 N.Y. 357,
118 N.E.2d 555 (1954) which involved the interpretation of special "Airline Trip Insur-
ance," and held the insurer liable in spite of an apparent exclusionary provision.
786 Exceptions, exclusions and exemptions are discussed in 7 Williston, Contracts §§
917-918 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
787 E.g., Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962);
American Surety Co. v. Rodek, 128 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1954) ; Hauenstein v. St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954).
788 In this case, the policy provided in pertinent part:
"6. Definitions.
* $ * * * $ * *
"(c) Products Hazard. The term 'products hazard' means
"(1) the handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty of
goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named
insured, * * * if the accident occurs after the insured has relinquished
possession thereof to others and away from premises owned, rented, or con-
trolled by the insured * * *." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
261 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1958) at 776.
789 261 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1958).
790 See 7 Williston, Contracts, Ch. 31 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
791 Although Sears prevailed in the original White litigation, while this appeal was
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In an action on an insurance contract which expressly excluded
liability for "products hazard," defined in the policy as meaning the
handling or use of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled, or
distributed by the insured if the accident should occur after the in-
sured had relinquished possession, judgment was for the insurer, Bitts
v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Vendor-insured's
customer had been injured when the latter opened the end of a re-
frigerator coil and it exploded. As the insured no longer had possession
of the coil, the appellate court affirmed.7"2
In two other cases, the insured fared no better. In United Pacific
Insurance Co. v. Schaecher,93 the insurer brought this action for de-
claratory relief to interpret products liability coverage of a compre-
hensive policy where the damage was caused by the emergence of live
beetles in wood used in finished homes based on breach of a warranty
of quality. 9 The insurer was held not liable since this was not an acci-
dent within the meaning of the policy, and the insured had not sustained
the burden of proving coverage.795
In the other case, Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,"'
the trial court dismissed the case and this appeal resulted. Again the
question as to the meaning of "accident" was before the court. It was
held that if the insured was obliged to repair or replace some product
of work which proved defective, this was not within the coverage of the
policy.79 It appeared that substantial damage to the stucco finish of
pending, this matter was not rendered moot. Sears seeks to recover its expense in defending
the White suit, for which Sears contends Travelers is liable, supra note 789, at 777.
792 167 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Furthermore, the coil was no longer on the
premises of the insured, a condition precedent to the insurer's liability.
793 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1960).
794 See 8 Williston §§ 973 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
795 The court observed that: "The term 'accident' has been variously defined. In United
States Mutual Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, 1889, 131 U.S. 100, at page 121, 9 S.Ct. 755, at page
762, 33 L. Ed. 60, 'accidental' is defined as 'happening' or chance, unexpectedly taking
place, not according to the usual course of things or not as expected. In Richards v. The
Travelers Ins. Co., 1891, 89 Cal. 170, at page 176, 26 P. 762, at page 763, 'accident' is de-
fined to include 'any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the
person acted upon and affected by the event.'" United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Schaecher,
supra note 793, 709 at 508.
796 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. App. 1960).
797 As the court observed: "In this connection, Exclusion (f) expressly excludes from
liability under the policy, damages sustained by any 'goods or products * * * or premises
alienated * * * or work completed * * * out of which the accident arises' (Emphasis
added.) This Exclusion means that if the insured becomes liable to replace or repair any
'goods or products' or 'premises alienated' or 'work completed' after the same has caused
an accident because of a defective condition, the cost of such replacement or repair is not
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certain houses was caused by a defect in the soil upon which the houses
were built. Since this was expressly excluded, there could be no re-
covery.
However, to counterbalance these adverse decisions, there is a case
of novel impression wherein the insurer sought a declaration of non-
coverage of a claim being made against its insured which arose under
a "dram shop" act.7 98 But the court, in American Surety Co. v Rodek,
799
found that the policy had been issued to defendants in connection with
the operation of their restaurant. They were alleged to have sold liquor
to an intoxicated patron thereby violating the Connecticut Dram Shop
Act. 00 Holding that the statute in question was "primarily compen-
satory in purpose rather than penal,"' 0 ' the court held that there was
no prohibition on insurance coverage. As to the second defense claimed
by the company, namely an exception under the products liability pro-
vision, it was pointed out that this exception would only cover a defect
in the product sold, but did not cover assaults committed by an intoxi-
cated person to whom liquor was sold. The insurance company was held
liable.0 2
A rather more representative type of products insurance case, one
from which prospective policy holders may take heart, is Bundy Tub-
ing Company v. Royal Indemnity Company."0 3 There, the insured was
faced with three actions in California and five in Michigan based on
alleged defects in certain tubing he had installed; the contractor called
on his products liability insurer to defend or settle these actions.
Thin steel tubing, used by building contractors and plumbers for
radiant heating, was installed in the concrete floors of houses or other
buildings without basements. 80 4 Hot water from a boiler flowed through
the tubing; when leaks developed, the aforementioned actions for
breach of warranty or negligence were filed against Bundy, the insured.
He settled several of these claims and then brought this action against
the insurance company. The trial court held that since the law suits in
recoverable under the policy." Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., supra note
796 at 331.
798 Connecticut Dram Shop Act, § 4307, G.S.1949.
799 128 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1954).
800 Supra note 798.
801 Illinois has a similar statute; Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 43, § 135.
802 American Surety Co. v. Rodek, 128 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1954).
803 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962).
804 Cf. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (19-).
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question against the insured involved negligence or breach of implied
warranty, the damages were not caused by accident and were therefore,
not covered by the policies. The insurer appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding:
The fact that the claims here involved breach of warranty or neg-
ligence did not remove them from the category of accident.80 5 Bundy
would not be legally obligated to pay a claim arising out of an acci-
dent occurring without its negligence or breach of warranty. If the li-
ability policy were construed so as to cover only accidents not involv-
ing breach of warranty or negligence, then no protection would be
given to the insured. The insured would not need liability insurance
which did not cover the only claims for which it could be held liable.
The word accident is common in most liability policies and should not
be construed in this type of case as not including claims involving neg-
ligence or breach of warranty.806
In support, the court cited Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indem-
nity Co., 807 particularly as to the definition and meaning of the word
"accident" as used in an insurance policy:
There is no doubt that the property damage to the building caused
by the application of defective plaster was 'caused by accident' within
the meaning of the insurance contract, since the damage was a com-
pletely unexpected and unintended result. Accident, as a source and
cause of damage to property, within the meaning of an accident policy,
is an unexpected unforeseen or undesigned happening or consequence
from either a known or an unknown cause.808
The court held for the insured and noted that a similar result was
reached in Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.,"0 9
where "recovery was allowed for the cost of removal of defective
aluminum doors" and the cost of installation of new ones.810
805 See 7 Williston, Contracts § 917 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
806 Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962).
807 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954).
808 Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., supra note 807.
809 51 Cal.2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959).
810 In Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., supra note 803, the court cited the
following cases: "Diefenbach v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 280 Mich. 507, 273 N.W.
783 (1937) ; Pawlicki v. Hollenbeck, 250 Mich. 38, 224 N.W. 626 (1930); Hunt v. United
States Accident Association, 146 Mich. 521, 109 N.W. 1042 (1906) ; New Amsterdam Casu-
alty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943)."
The insurer was also held liable in General Casualty Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d 170 (8th
Cir. 1952) ; Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1952)
cert. den. 344 U.S. 920; Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d
293 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Nielson v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 174 F. Supp. 648 (D. Iowa 1959),
afl'd 277 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1959) ; King v. Macon, 5 So.2d 705 (La. App. 1957), af'd 234
La. 299, 99 So.2d 117; McAllister v. Century Indemnity Co., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d
345 (1953), afl'd 12 N.J. 395, 97 A.2d 160, where the policy was characterized as "most
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
From what has been said, it must be apparent that a growing
number of jurisdictions are giving the new homeowner who buys his
dreamhouse from a builder-vendor a remedy for defective construc-
tion, or latent defects in the land upon which the residence is built.
In some jurisdictions, the remedy, whether in damages or for re-
scission, is based on breach of a constructive warranty (not dependent
on the contract) or on principles of strict liability. One thing is cer-
tain-a substantial expansion of consumer protection in home-buying
is the growing and desirable trend.
To summarize:
1. The warranty of habitability as presently applied by the
courts is based largely on the public policy which dictates recovery by
the injured party in product liability cases;
2. There is a growing trend to hold the builder-vendor responsible
for defects in new houses or for improper soil conditions based on the
buyer's reliance on the builder's skill and knowledge;
3. This newer form of consumer protection seems destined to
become the majority rule in the near future;
4. In landlord and tenant situations, several jurisdictions have
adopted legislation authorizing the lessee to make necessary repairs and
deduct the cost from the rent payment; finally,
5. Spreading or sharing the risk by means of liability insur-
ance has been suggested as the realistic solution of what otherwise may
become an intolerable burden.
In any event, adoption and enforcement of the warranty of habita-
bility should do much to discourage the shoddy construction and jerry-
building that has become increasingly perceptible over the years.
ambiguous" and accordingly, all doubts were resolved in favor of the insured; Philadelphia
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Grandview, 42 Wash.2d 357, 255 P.2d 540 (1953).
And see cases cited in 7 Williston, Contracts § 901, pp. 97-98 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
